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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Section 78A-4103(2)0).
ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION
Issue 1: Whether the district court correctly concluded that, under Jensen v.
Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, 130 P.3d 325, claims that are based on the exact same operative
facts that would support a defamation claim are subject to Utah's one-year limitations
period for defamation.
Standard of Review: A district court's grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure presents a question of law that this Court
reviews for correctness. Oakwood Vill. L.L.C. v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, Tf 9, 104
P.3d 1226. Significantly, however, due to the First Amendment interests at stake when
allegedly defamatory conduct is at issue, this Court applies a unique standard of review
under which (unlike a normal motion to dismiss) the nonmoving party is not entitled to
any inferences in his favor. Jacob v. Bezzant, 2009 UT 37, «f[ 18, 212 P.3d 535 ("'To
accommodate the respect we accord its protections of speech, the First Amendment's
presence merits altering our customary rules of review by denying a nonmoving party the
benefit of a favorable interpretation of factual inferences.'" (quoting O'Connor v.
Burningham, 2007 UT 58, ^ 27, 165 P.3d 1214)).
Preservation: This issue was preserved by written motion and memoranda, (R.
447,453-55, 1116, 1131-32), and by oral argument (R. 1560, at 6:18-8:7; 104:23-107:1),
6

and was discussed in the district court's final Memorandum Decision and Order. (R.
1523-32.)
Issue 2: Whether the district court correctly concluded that petitioning the Utah
Division of Real Estate ("UDRE") for revocation of a real estate broker's license based
on allegedly sanctionable misconduct constitutes petitioning of a governmental agency
within the scope of immunity afforded by the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine.
Standard of Review: A district court's grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure presents a question of law that this Court
reviews for correctness. Oakwood Vill LLC,

2004 UT 101 at f 9. However, because

the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine is based on "[t]he First Amendment. . . right to 'petition
the Government for a redress of grievances,'" Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36,
If 26, 116 P.3d 323 (quoting U.S. Const, amend. I), as with Issue 1, this Court should
apply Utah's unique standard of review for claims implicating First Amendment interests
under which (unlike a normal motion to dismiss) the nonmoving party is not entitled to
any inferences in his favor. Jacob, 2009 UT 37 at f 18.
Alternatively, if this Court is not inclined to apply the unique standard of review
set forth in Jacob to Issue 2, this Court "acceptfs] the factual allegations in the complaint
as true and interprets] those facts and all inferences drawn from them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff as the non-moving party." Oakwood Vill LLC,

2004 UT 101

at ]f 9. In doing so, however, this Court "need not accept extrinsic facts not pleaded."
Osguthorpe v. WolfMountain Resorts, LC, 2010 UT 29,1f 10, 232 P.3d 999. Nor is this
Court required to accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations in the
7
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complaint. See id.; Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9, ^ 60,
70 P.3d 17 ("[T]he sufficiency of [the plaintiffs] pleadings must be determined by the
facts pleaded rather than the conclusions stated." (internal quotations omitted)).
Preservation: This issue was preserved by written motion and memoranda, (R.
1116, 1132-36), and by oral argument (R. 1560, at 24:11-43:17, 107:4-114:6), and was
discussed in the district court's final Memorandum Decision and Order. (R. 1532-40.)
Issue 3: Whether, as an alternate ground for affirming the district court's rulings,
the Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed because it violates Rule 8 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by failing to differentiate among the allegedly wrongful
conduct of the numerous defendants.
Standard of Review: A district court's grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure presents a question of law that this Court
reviews for correctness. Oakwood Vill. L.L.C., 2004 UT 101 at ^f 9. In conducting this
review, this Court "may affirm the decision rendered below 7 ... on a ground on which the
district court did not rely." First Equity Fed., Inc. v. Phillips Dev., LC, 2002 UT 56, ^f 11,
52P.3dll37.
Preservation: This issue was preserved by written motion and memoranda. (R.
1116, 1137-40); see also First Equity Fed, Inc., 2002 UT 56 at If 11 ("[I]t is well
established that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such
ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or
action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on
8

appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed
on by the lower court.").
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
•

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
•

Utah Code section 78B-2-302 provides that:
An action may be brought within one year:
(1) for liability created by the statutes of a foreign state;
(2) upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture where the action is given to an
individual, or to an individual and the state, except when the statute
imposing it prescribes a different limitation;
(3) upon a statute, or upon an undertaking in a criminal action, for a
forfeiture or penalty to the state;
(4) for libel, slander, false imprisonment, or seduction;
(5) against a sheriff or other officer for the escape of a prisoner arrested or
imprisoned upon either civil or criminal process;
(6) against a municipal corporation for damages or injuries to property
caused by a mob or riot;
(7) except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, against a county
legislative body or a county executive to challenge a decision of the county
legislative body or county executive, respectively; or
(8) on a claim for relief or a cause of action under Title 63L, Chapter 5,
Utah Religious Land Use Act.

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-302.
9

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below.
Plaintiff/Appellant Douglas Bates ("Bates") was a Utah "Principal Broker" and the
founder, president, and sole shareholder of AUPro Realty Group, Inc. ("AUPro"), which
by September 2007 was the largest real estate brokerage in the state. (R. 264, ffl[ 19-20,
22.) By fall 2008, with the housing market in rapid decline, Bates's business collapsed,
and he failed to pay over half a million dollars in commissions owed to his AUPro real
estate agents. (R. 276, ffl[ 85, 87; R. 281, <h 140; R. 317, H 331; R. 1560, at 29:14-30:8,
54:23-56:13,69:15-75:13.)
As a result of these events, Defendant/Appellee Thomas Johnson ("Johnson") and
"at least forty other unknown Defendants" allegedly held a meeting at which they "signed
a petition[] for the UDRE to revoke Bates's [real estate] license," (R. 276,ffl[88-89), and,
shortly thereafter, Defendant/Appellee Charles Smalley and "Dee Johnson" initiated an
administrative proceeding against Bates before the UDRE. (R. 277,ffif93-95.) The basis
on which the petition filed with the UDRE sought revocation of Bates's real estate license
was that his nonpayment of commissions to his AUPro real estate agents constituted
sanctionable misconduct under Utah law. (R. 1159-63.) In a twenty-four page written
decision, the Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismissed the proceeding for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. (R. 1145-68.)
In addition, in December 2008, the Salt Lake Board of Realtors ("SLBR")
expelled Bates from the SLBR for violation of the SLBR's policies and procedures. (R.
10

133.) Bates's expulsion from the SLBR and his failure to comply with the SLBR's
policies and procedures were reported in a KSL news broadcast that same month. (R.
274,1flf 67-72.)
Bates responded to the attempt to revoke his license and his expulsion from the
SLBR with a massive retaliatory lawsuit. (R. 1-143.) His initial Complaint in this case,
filed on January 24, 2011, named no fewer than thirty-seven state officials, realtor
organizations, and individuals whom he alleged had wronged him. (R. 1-143.) Bates's
claims ran the gamut from violations of due process, to malicious prosecution, to slander,
to wrongful civil proceedings, to violations of the Open and Public Meetings Act, to
intentional infliction of emotional distress, to violations of Utah's antitrust statutes. (Id.)
Over the next several months, Bates filed two more complaints, repeatedly changing his
various causes of action and the parties whom he was purporting to sue. (R. 144-380.)
Bates's Second Amended Complaint, filed May 4, 2011, without the leave of court
required for multiple amendments, named thirteen parties as defendants, was seventyfour pages long, contained more than four-hundred paragraphs, and included nine causes
of action: Defamation, Defamation Per Se, Conspiracy to Defame, False Light, Unfair
Business Practices, Abuse of Process, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations,
Tortious Interference with Economic Relations, and Conspiracy to Destroy Trade. (R.
261-380.)

The central thrust of the allegations was that mostly undifferentiated

"Defendants" defamed, brought improper administrative proceedings against, or
discriminated against Bates in an effort to blacken his personal and professional
reputation and thereby squeeze him out of the Utah real estate market following his
11

nonpayment of commissions to AllPro real estate agents. (Id.) As a result of this alleged
conduct, the Second Amended Complaint sought (1) injunctive relief reinstating Bates as
a member of the SLBR, modifying the requirements of brokerage multiple-listing
membership, and prohibiting allegedly "uncompetitive polices and discrimination"
against Bates; (2) declaratory relief regarding Bates's realtor membership; (3) statutory
and treble damages for alleged antitrust violations; (4) compensatory damages over $5
million; and (5) punitive damages of $10 million. (R. 333-34,fflf1-10.)
As relevant to this appeal, following service of the Second Amended Complaint,
the defendants filed the following motions to dismiss: Motion to Dismiss Claims Against
Defendant Jillinda Bowers; Salt Lake Board of Realtors and Bryan Kohler's Motion to
Dismiss under Rule 12(c); Motion to Dismiss Utah Association of Realtors and
Christopher Kyler Pursuant to 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Motion to
Dismiss Claims Against Wasatch Front Regional MLS; Defendant Thomas Johnson's
Motion to Dismiss; Defendant Mark Steinegal and Charles Smalley's Motion to Dismiss;
and Motion to Dismiss Defendants Ostermiller, Hoover, and Northern Wasatch
Association of Realtors (collectively, "Defendants' Motions to Dismiss"). (R. 1516.)1
On November 28, 2011, the district court held a hearing on the Defendants'
Motions to Dismiss and granted the motions from the bench. (R. 1560 at 122:7-17.) In

1

Wasatch Front Regional MLS, Michael J. Ostermiller, Sandra Hoover, Northern
Wasatch Association of Realtors, Salt Lake Board of Realtors, Bryan Kohler, Utah
Association of Realtors, Christopher Kyler, Brady Long, Randall Wall, and Equity
Realtors, L.L.C. d/b/a Equity Real Estate all filed joinders in the other Defendants'
motions to dismiss. (R. 1516 n.l.)
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its Memorandum Decision and Order dated December 29, 2011 ("Order"), the district
court explained its reasoning for doing so. (R. 1515-41.)
The district court first held that, under Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, 130 P.3d
325, Bates's four defamation-related claims (causes of action one through four) are
barred by Utah's one-year limitations period for defamation set forth in Utah Code
Section 78B-2-302(4). (R. 1524-25.) The district court explained that:
Because the Second Amended Complaint alleges these claims with little
effort to distinguish between individual actors or facts, it is difficult to
determine which allegedly defamatory conduct is attributable to which
Defendant. Regarding Johnson and Bowers, for example, the Second
Amended Complaint is reasonably specific that the sole allegations against
them are based on allegedly defamatory statements they made to a KSL
news reporter on December 10, 2008. Regarding the other Defendants,
however, the allegations are often more indefinite and undifferentiated . . . .
Regardless, the latest defamatory conduct sufficiently identified in the
Second Amended Complaint allegedly occurred on March 19, 2009, almost
two years before Bates filed his initial Complaint in this case on January
24, 2011. As a result, Bates's four defamation-related claims are timebarred under the applicable one-year limitations period.
(R. 1524-25.) Bates has challenged no aspect of this portion of the district court's Order
on appeal.2

2

Bates concedes, as he must, the correctness of the district court's ruling that Utah's oneyear limitations period for defamation bars causes of action one through four against the
defendants by failing to raise any aspect of that ruling on appeal. (R. 1549 (limiting
Notice of Appeal to "such part of the order that dismisses causes of action five (5)
through nine (9) with prejudice"); Brief of Appellant at 1, 13-15 (limiting appeal of
district court's limitations-period rulings to causes of action five through nine); id. at 13
(admitting appropriateness of district court's application of Utah's one-year limitations
period for defamation to causes of action one through four)); see also, e.g., Brown v.
Glover, 2000 UT 89,U 23, 16 P.3d 540 (stating that issues not presented in opening brief
are waived).
13

Next, relying on the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Jensen that "'the statute of
limitations for defamation governs claims based on the same operative facts that would
support a defamation action,'" the district court held that, "to the extent Bates's
remaining claims [causes of action five through nine] arise from the same operative facts
as his four defamation-related claims, Bates's remaining claims are also governed by
Utah's one-year limitations period applicable to defamation, and are similarly timebarred." (R. 1525 (quoting Jensen, 2005 UT 81 at ^ 53).) In doing so, the district court
reiterated its earlier finding that "the sole allegations against [Johnson and Bowers] are
based on allegedly defamatory conduct," (R. 1532), which, as noted above, Bates has
failed to challenge and thereby conceded on appeal. (See Brief of Appellant at 1-2, 1315.)3 "[T]his conclusion," the district court held, "means that all claims against [Johnson
and Bowers] are time-barred and hereby dismissed." (Id.)
The district court then disposed of causes of action five through nine as alleged
against the remaining defendants by holding that, "to the extent Bates's remaining claims
do not arise from the same operative facts as his four defamation-related claims, Bates's
remaining claims are barred by the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine." (R. 1540.)
In doing so, the district court determined that, by petitioning the UDRE for
revocation of Bates's real estate broker's license based on allegedly sanctionable
Bates similarly failed to contest in the district court, either in his memorandum in
opposition to Bowers's motion to dismiss, (R. 960-63), or at the November 28, 2011
hearing on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, (R. 1560, at 56-103, 118-20), Bowers's
argument, raised both in her opening supporting memorandum, (R. 455), and at oral
argument (R. 1560, at 7:4-8:7), that the sole allegations against her in the Second
Amended Complaint are based on two allegedly defamatory statements that she made to
a KSL reporter on December 10, 2008.
14

misconduct, the remaining defendants were engaged in petitioning of a governmental
agency within the scope of immunity afforded by the Noerr--Pennington Doctrine. (R.
1534-35.)
The district court also concluded that, for two independent reasons, the "sham"
exception to the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine is inapplicable to prevent dismissal of
Bates's causes of action five through nine against the remaining defendants. (R. 153540.) First, the district court held that:
The UDRE petition was not objectively baseless because Bates's admitted
nonpayment of earned commissions, especially on the scale and magnitude
mentioned in the complaint, gave Defendants probable cause to allege he
had failed "within a reasonable time, to account for or to remit any monies
coming into the person's possession that belong to others," Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-2-1 l(6)(a); had improperly diverted funds, id. § 61-2-1 l(6)(c); was
unworthy or incompetent to act as a principal broker, id. § 61-2-11(8); and
was engaged in "dishonest dealing."
Id. § 61-2-11(17).
(R. 1539.) Second, the district court held that, "even assuming Bates were able to
demonstrate the UDRE complaint was objectively baseless (which is not the case), he
still cannot show it was brought with the subjective intent to harm him rather than to
procure the relief sought in the [administrative] complaint." (R. 1539.)
On January 24, 2012, Bates filed a Notice of Appeal in the Utah Supreme Court
only with respect to that "part of the [district court's] order that dismisses causes of
action five (5) through nine (9) with prejudice." (R. 1548-49.) On February 2, 2012, the
Utah Supreme Court gave notice of the transfer of the appeal to this Court. (R. 1552,
1555.)

15

II.

Statement of Facts Relevant to the Utah Association of Realtors and
Christopher Kyler,
Mr. Kyler and the Utah Association of Realtors ("UAR") are mentioned only

cryptically and sporadically throughout the Second Amended Complaint and are most
often glommed together with the other defendants. But, through a painstaking exegesis
of the complaint, one might be able to deduce, at best, that Mr. Kyler (on behalf of the
UAR) met with some of the other defendants in November, 2008, to discuss how to
administratively revoke Mr. Bates's real estate license. (See, e.g., R. 276-77, ^f 90; R.
297, 1} 223.) However, Mr. Bates does not allege what, if anything, was said by Mr.
Kyler during that alleged meeting, what his or the UAR's role in the conspiracy was, nor
does he allege any facts to establish that Mr. Kyler (or the UAR) took any action to
participate in the alleged conspiracies that preceded or followed.
Rather, in an attempt to tie the conduct of all defendants to the specific actions of
some, Mr. Bates relies on bald, conclusory assertions that "each Defendant was acting as
the agent of the other, and each was acting in the course and scope of its agency with its
principal," (R. 286, ]f 168), and that "[t]he UAR is directly tied to the conduct referred to
herein" because "UDRE Commission chairmen H. Blaine Walker and Doyle 'Sam'
Sampson, and president of the SLBR Defendant Bowers, all have close and personal
relationships, shared interests and animosity against Bates." (R. 284-85, <f 161).
There are no specific allegations of wrongdoing on the part of the UAR or Mr.
Kyler, particularly with regard to the alleged defamatory conduct and the alleged
conspiracy to exclude Mr. Bates's operation of the UtahMLS.com. Instead, the UAR and
16

Mr. Kyler (and all defendants for that matter) are, according to Mr. Bates, guilty by
association.

"Together," Mr. Bates alleges, "named Defendants, including Does,

depended upon each Defendants' advantages and spheres of influence, including those
held in public offices under the Utah Division of Real Estate and positions of power in
the UAR, NWAR and SLBR to bring about a common purpose of permanently
eliminating the Plaintiff from the Utah real estate industry by carrying out an intricate
campaign of defamation and publicly attempting to revoke his license in an effort to
blacken his professional and personal reputation, and cause public hatred towards him."
(R. 297-98, If 228; see also R. 327, If 398.)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, 130 P.3d 325, not only are Mr. Bates's
four defamation-related claims (causes of action one through four) barred by Utah's oneyear limitations period for defamation actions set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2302(4), but also his remaining causes of action are barred by the same statute because
they arise from the same operative facts as the defamation claims.
To the extent Mr. Bates's remaining claims do not arise from the same operative
facts as his time-barred defamation claims, they are, nevertheless, barred by the NoerrPennington Doctrine, a First Amendment doctrine that applies with equal force to state
tort law and federal antitrust claims and safeguards the defendants' right to petition their
government for redress of their grievances. The gravamen of Mr. Bates's complaint is
that the defendants conspired to remove him from the Utah real estate industry by
revoking his real estate license through a licensing revocation investigation and
proceeding before the UDRE.

Since the UDRE is, undoubtedly, a vehicle of the

government, the defendants' conduct in seeking to have the UDRE revoke Mr. Bates's
license was petitioning activity protected by Noerr-Pennington.
The sham exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity does not apply because the
UDRE petition was not objectively meritless. The defendants had probable cause to
believe that Mr. Bates's admitted failure to pay his real estate agents their earned
commissions rendered him guilty of failing "to account for or to remit monies ... that
belong to others," Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-1 l(6)(a); "diverting monies ... from the
purpose for which they were received," id. § 61-2-1 l(6)(c); "being unworthy or
18

incompetent to act as a principal broker," id. § 61-2-11(8); "dishonest dealing," id. §612-11(17); or "unprofessional conduct," id. § 61-2-11(18). Even if the defendants lacked
probable cause to make these allegations in the UDRE petition, the sham exception also
does not apply because Mr. Bates admits that the defendants' intent was to revoke his
license.

Where the defendants' alleged conduct is "genuinely aimed at procuring

favorable government action," the sham exception does not apply. Anderson Dev. Co. v.
Tobias, 2005 UT 36,127, 116 P.3d 323.
Finally, although not a basis for its ruling, the district court may be affirmed on the
ground that the pro se Second Amended Complaint does not comply with Rule 8 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, sets forth nothing but conclusory allegations against the
UAR and Mr. Kyler, and, therefore, should be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT MR.
BATES'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY UTAH'S
ONE-YEAR
LIMITATIONS PERIOD FOR DEFAMATION.
The UAR and Mr. Kyler hereby join in the Argument section of the brief filed by

Defendant/Appellee Jillinda Bowers as it pertains to the statute of limitations.

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT MR.
BATES'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE NOERR-PENNINGTON
DOCTRINE.
Mr. Bates begins the Noerr-Pennington section of his brief with the

uncontroversial proposition that Noerr-Pennington immunity is grounded in the First
Amendment. (See Brief of Appellant at 15-17, § II.A.) From there, he launches into a
confusing discussion of an alleged dichotomy between Noerr-Pennington immunity
applied to underlying state tort claims versus Noerr-Pennington immunity applied to
underlying federal antitrust claims, erroneously contending that "although the U.S.
Supreme Court has extended Noerr immunity derived from the Sherman Act to conduct
alleged to be illegal, any Noerr immunity derived from the First Amendment cannot
immunize illegal conduct[.]..." (Brief of Appellant at 18, § II.B.) Mr. Bates tries to
leverage this false dichotomy to his advantage by contending that where the underlying
claims are state tort claims (as in this case), the Noerr-Pennington immunity "Only
Qualifies for First Amendment Treatment," (Brief of Appellant at 16, § II.A), as if the
alleged First Amendment version of immunity is somehow inferior to the purportedly
different Sherman Act version of immunity. (See Brief of Appellant at 16.)
In reality, the Noerr-Pennington analysis is the same whether the underlying
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claims are state tort or federal antitrust claims. Again, it is almost universally recognized
that Noerr-Pennington immunity is grounded in the First Amendment. What Mr. Bates
perceives as an advantageous distinction in the case law—"any Noerr immunity derived
from the First Amendment cannot immunize illegal conduct," (Brief of Appellant at 18,
§ II.B)—is really just Mr. Bates's contorted view of a universal truism: conduct that is
not immune is not immune.
As the following analysis demonstrates, the overarching presence of the First
Amendment hurts rather than helps Mr. Bates. It highlights the fundamental problem
with his case—he is improperly suing the defendants for exercising their First
Amendment right to petition the Utah Division of Real Estate to revoke Mr. Bates's real
estate license. Rather than providing shelter and refuge for Mr. Bates's claims, the First
Amendment (by medium of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine) compels their rejection.
A.

Noerr-Pennington immunity is grounded in the First Amendment.

Utah courts have consistently characterized Noerr-Pennington immunity as a type
of First Amendment immunity. "The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees citizens the right to 'petition the Government for a redress of grievances.'"
Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, t 26, 116 P.3d 323 (quoting U.S. Const,
amend. I). "In recognition of this right, the United States Supreme Court has held that
individuals and organizations are immune from liability under antitrust laws for actions
constituting petitions to the government." Id. "Over the years, courts have extended this
immunity doctrine, referred to as the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, see R.A. V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 420 ... (1992), to 'protect ... political activity against tort claims as
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well as antitrust claims.'" Id. (quoting Searle v. Johnson, 646 P.2d 682, 684 (Utah
1982)).
This Court recently acknowledged (in passing) that the Noerr-Pennington
Doctrine is a form of First Amendment immunity, noting, in Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch
Landowners Ass'n v. Grassy Meadows Airport, Inc., 2012 UT App 182, If 17 n.10, that
since "the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine relied on by the trial court may ultimately apply,
defeating [the] tortious interference claim," the trial court needed to analyze whether one
of the parties "waived its constitutional right to petition the zoning board in a valid
contract or otherwise." In other words, the "constitutional right to petition" invoked the
"Noerr-Pennington Doctrine," and, consistent with other Utah opinions, this Court spoke
of Noerr-Pennington and First Amendment immunity interchangeably.
Accordingly, whether such immunity is labeled "Noerr-Pennington" immunity or
First Amendment immunity, and whether the underlying claims asserted against the party
claiming immunity in any given case involve state tort claims or federal antitrust claims,
the immunity analysis remains the same and petitioning the government remains a
fundamentally protected constitutional right.
B.

The district court correctly concluded that the Noerr-Pennington
Doctrine applied to the state law claims alleged by Mr. Bates.

Although not raised below, Mr. Bates now argues that the immunity afforded by
Noerr-Pennington is circumscribed when the claims alleged are state-law claims rather
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than federal antitrust claims,4 and that, as a result, the district court erred in applying the
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine without allegedly conducting a separate First Amendment
analysis. What Mr. Bates fails to understand is that a Noerr-Pennington analysis is a
First Amendment analysis.
In support of his argument, Mr. Bates relies on Astoria Entertainment, Inc. v.
DeBartolo, 12 So. 3d 956 (La. 2009), in which the Louisiana Supreme Court held that
criminal conduct (bribing public officials to allow riverboat gambling) is not entitled to
First Amendment immunity. The Astoria case is unhelpful for several reasons.,
First, the conduct alleged in Astoria was criminal in nature, unlike the tortious
conduct alleged in this case. Id. at 967 ("Considering the extent of criminality alleged to
be involved in this case, we do not believe that the United States Supreme Court would
be inclined to find that Noerr-Pennington provides civil immunity to the defendants.55).
Thus, the Astoria holding is admittedly narrow and limited to its facts—"even accepting
that Noerr-Pennington is generally applicable in our state courts, and to state law claims,

Mr. Bates failed to raise this issue below and therefore did not preserve the issue for
appeal. See Donjuan v. McDermott, 2011 UT 72, % 20, 266 P.3d 839 ("To properly
preserve an issue for appellate review, the issue must be raised in the district court.
Additionally, the issue must be specifically raised, in a timely manner, and must be
supported by evidence and relevant legal authority.55).
Mr. Bates's brief fails to include a citation to the record showing that this issue
was preserved, (Brief of Appellant at 2), and the record clearly demonstrates that this
issue was never raised below. {See R. 1248-50.) Because Mr. Bates has not argued that
this Court should consider the issue under the exceptional circumstances or plain error
standards of review, the Court should refuse to consider the new argument.
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we must still determine whether the doctrine is applicable based on the specific facts of
this case." Id. at 964.
Second, the Astoria court made no attempt to analyze or set forth a test for
determining whether the conduct alleged in that case constituted petitioning activity. The
court simply pronounced the defendants' alleged conduct was "criminal" and concluded
that it was not entitled to First Amendment immunity, stating: "We find that the alleged
bribery and corruption in this case are not petitioning activities that should be
constitutionally protected."

Id. at 967.

The Astoria decision gives absolutely no

guidance for how a court is supposed to determine what constitutes petitioning activity
and what does not. However, it seems clear from the court's description of the corruption
involved that the court based its rationale, at least in part, upon the fact that the conduct
complained of was not the defendants' use of state administrative proceedings to achieve
an outcome they desired but, rather, $400,000.00 in bribery payments made to the
governor to tilt the administrative process.

Obviously, the $400,000.00 in bribery

payments occurred outside the channels of any formal governmental proceeding, unlike
the UDRE administrative petition Mr. Bates complains about in this case.
Third, the Astoria court made an unnecessary distinction between NoerrPennington immunity and First Amendment immunity even though it openly
acknowledged "that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine stems ... from the right to petition
governments granted by the First Amendment." Id. at 962. If there is a difference in
Noerr-Pennington immunity analysis and First Amendment immunity analysis, the
Astoria court failed to say what it is. And while the Astoria court acknowledged "that
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there is no reason that the constitutional protection of the right to petition should be less
compelling in the context of claims that arise outside of the scope of antitrust laws," the
Astoria court nevertheless created a dichotomy between Noerr-Pennington immunity and
First Amendment immunity, when, in reality, they are one and the same. Id. at 964.
Simply put, the Astoria court makes the proverbial distinction without a difference.
The unduly dichotomous approach adopted in Astoria and by Mr. Bates is
inconsistent with the almost universally accepted Noerr-Pennington analysis applied by
the Utah Supreme Court and federal and state courts throughout the country.

These

courts correctly recognize that Noerr-Pennington is a First Amendment doctrine, and
that, consequently, "'[tjhere is simply no reason that a common-law tort doctrine can any
more permissibly abridge or chill the constitutional right of petition than can a statutory
claim such as antitrust.'" Theme Promotions, Inc. v. News America Marketing FSI, 546
F.3d 991, 1007 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Video Int'l Prod, Inc. v. Warner-Amex Cable
Comm., Inc., 858 F.2d 1075, 1084 (5th Cir. 1988)); see also Harrah's Vicksburg Corp. v.
Pennebaker, 812 So. 2d 163, 171 (Miss. 2001) (same)).
Thus, although the claims raised in Anderson were state law claims—including
some of the very claims alleged in Mr. Bates's Second Amended Complaint—and
accused the defendants of engaging in "illegal" conduct, the Utah Supreme Court applied
the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine/First Amendment to bar the state law tort claims and
protect the defendants' right to petition their government. 2005 UT 36 at fflf 26-28. In
fact, the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that the defendants' First Amendment
petitioning rights were so paramount that, "[e]ven if, as [the plaintiff] alleges, [the
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defendants] misrepresented to the City Council ..., the use of that 'improper means'
would not be sufficient to except [the defendants] from the immunity provided under the
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine in light of their uncontested intent to achieve a favorable
governmental result." Id. at ^f 28.
In Searle, a case involving tortious interference claims, the Utah Supreme Court
acknowledged that "[t]he First Amendment protects expressions designed to influence
governmental action even when the content of those expressions brings incidental injury
to parties concerned."

646 P.2d at 689 (emphasis added).

Searle makes clear

expressions or petitions within the context of a formal governmental proceeding are
absolutely immune (barring application of any relevant sham exception), whereas
expressions or petitions outside the context of a formal government proceeding enjoy no
such absolute immunity.
Hence the Searle court held that the Humane Society's "media campaign to
increase public awareness of conditions at [a dog] pound in order to create public
pressure upon government officials to make improvements" was not petitioning activity
entitled to Noerr-Pennington/Fivst Amendment immunity because "[p]art of this publicity
was directed outside Uintah County in an attempt to discourage tourists from visiting the
area until conditions were corrected" and did not involve (at least directly) the channels
of government. Id. at 683. The Searle court held that there is no immunity where the
alleged injury results "not from defendants' complaints to city and county officials or
from their reports concerning conditions at the dog pound" but from conduct occurring
outside the formal channels of government. Id. at 689.
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The Searle and Anderson cases establish the principal that it is the conduct of the
party seeking immunity and the context in which that conduct occurs—not the theory of
liability asserted by the plaintiff—that governs application of Noerr-Pennington/¥irst
Amendment immunity.

Consequently, Mr. Bates's assertion that Noerr-Pennington

immunity should not apply simply because he claims he has alleged "illegal conduct,
including libel, intentional interference with economic relations, and abuse of process,"
(Brief of Appellant at 18), is misguided and directly contrary to the Utah Supreme
Court's established precedents.5 Where, as here, the conduct alleged to have caused

5

In addition to claiming, contrary to the holding in Anderson, that tortious interference is
"illegal" conduct that cannot be immunized under Noerr-Pennington, Mr. Bates also
claims that Defendants Steinagel and Smalley, who were members of the UDRE, acted
illegally by "entertaining" and investigating complaints from the defendants about Mr.
Bates's failure to pay commissions due and owing because the Administrative Law Judge
ultimately determined that the UDRE lacked subject matter jurisdiction to resolve such
complaints pursuant to Utah Admin. Code Rl62-7-1. (Brief of Appellant at 19-20.)
Although Mr. Bates conclusorily claims that such conduct is "illegal," he provides no
legal authority to support his claims. Moreover, even if such alleged conduct was, in
fact, illegal, "[tjhere simply is no exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine regarding
avoidance or undermining the effectiveness of law or policy; nor is there an exception
regarding misapplication of the law or policy." Harrah's Vicksburg Corp., 812 So. 2d at
173; see also City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., 499 U.S. 365, 378-79 (1991)
(refusing to except immunity for an unlawful conspiracy between government officials,
declaring "Congress has passed other laws aimed at combating corruption in state and
local governments").
Moreover, it should be recognized that, in 2009, Rule Rl62-7-1 was amended to
clarify that investigations, such as occurred in this case, into an alleged violation of Utah
Code § 61-2-11 are authorized "even if the complaint is related to a commission dispute."
Notice of Proposed Rule, R162-7-1, DAR File No. 32586, published May 15, 2009,
attached hereto as Addendum A. Thus, the UDRE did not lack subject matter
jurisdiction to investigate Mr. Bates's failure to pay commissions when such conduct
constituted a violation of multiple provisions of Section 61-2-11.
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injury was the defendants' utilization of the formal, public processes of government,
Noerr-Pennington immunity applies.
C.

The district court correctly concluded that defendants5 alleged
petitions to the UDRE constitute political activity protected by the
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine.

Recognizing that the gravamen of the Second Amended Complaint is grounded in
the defendants' constitutionally protected petitioning activity, Mr. Bates seeks to avoid
application of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine by arguing that the defendants' petitioning
conduct is not political activity or petitioning conduct because (1) the defendants'
conduct allegedly "offers no political justification and was completely absent of any
public actor," and (2) "the petition was directed towards people 'unaccountable to the
public and without official authority' ... and were therefore not 'public' and a petition
directed towards them was not political activity." (Brief of Appellant at 22.) Neither of
these contentions has merit.
1.

The gravamen of Mr. Bates's complaint constitutes
constitutionally protected petitioning activity.

Although Mr. Bates's Second Amended Complaint unquestionably seeks to hold
the defendants liable for their alleged petitions to the UDRE, Mr. Bates contends that the
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine should not apply because a portion of the conduct alleged in
the Second Amended Complaint is conduct "independent of petitioning conduct." (Brief
of Appellant at 23.) 6 However, in so arguing, Mr. Bates fails to recognize that each of

In addition to the fact that Mr. Bates failed to preserve this argument for appeal, his
citation to over 170 paragraphs of the more than 400-paragraph Second Amended
Complaint, without more, as evidence that the Second Amended Complaint alleged non28

the causes of action alleged in the Second Amended Complaint is based, in whole or in
substantial part, on the defendants' alleged petitioning conduct.
For example, Mr. Bates's Unfair Business Practices Act claim expressly
references the administrative proceeding before the UDRE and seeks damages, inter alia,
for "lost earnings, historically, as a result of administrative proceedings brought against
him"; "lost future earnings as a Utah broker"; "costs of legal representation during
administrative investigations"; and "costs of legal representation in defending against
administrative proceedings." (R. 311,ffif303-06; R. 312-13, H 312.) Additionally, Mr.
Bates also seeks punitive damages under his Unfair Business Practices claim for "the use
of public offices and influence ... to gain unfair economic advantage and carry out anticompetitive and discriminatory behavior." (R. 313, f 313.)

Similarly, Mr. Bates

expressly relies on the initiation of the administrative proceedings to allege an Abuse of
Process claim, (R. 318, Iflj 334-37), a Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations

petitioning activity essentially shifts "'the burden of research and argument to the
reviewing court.'" Ogden City v. Fernandez, 2006 UT App 279, at *5 (unpublished)
(quoting Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, If 8, 995 P.2d 14). Thus, this Court should
dismiss this argument as inadequately briefed. See id.
Moreover, it must be noted that the Second Amended Complaint failed to allege
any factual allegations that the UAR or Mr. Kyler engaged in non-petitioning activities.
Indeed, although Mr. Bates refers this Court to over 170 paragraphs of the Second
Amended Complaint that he contends constitute allegations of non-petitioning conduct of
the defendants, only 13 paragraphs even refer to the UAR or Mr. Kyler. Of those 13
paragraphs, none contains any factual allegations. Rather, the paragraphs merely
indirectly refer to the UAR or Mr. Kyler or simply contain conclusory allegations. {See
R. 265,1}23; R. 272,1 58; R. 284, ^ 155, 157, 159, 161; R. 305,ffl[261, 263; R. 306,1f
275; R. 309, If 292; R. 311-12,ffif307-308; R. 328, % 400.) Accordingly, as set forth in
more detail below, this Court may also affirm the district court's dismissal for failure to
plead an action against the UAR and Mr. Kyler.
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claim, (R. 319,fflf343-46), a Tortious Interference with Economic Relations claim, (R.
322-23, TfTf 366-69), and a Conspiracy claim, (R. 326, Tf 391; R. 328, % 401.)7
Additionally, Mr. Bates claimed that the defendants' alleged petitions to the
UDRE, the administrative agency that is statutorily responsible for overseeing the
issuance and revocation of licenses for real estate brokers and agents operating in Utah,
see Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-201, were "centered around [Mr. Bates], AllPro, and [Mr.
Bates's] brokerage license [and] the revocation of such license...." (R. 297, ^ 226.) Mr.
Bates conceded that "AllPro was unable to pay due commissions," (R. 316-17, ^f 331),
that this non-payment of commissions was the central issue placed before the
administrative tribunal, (see, e.g., R. 276, ffif 86-89; R. 277, ffll 96, 112; R. 316, If 329),
and that, as the object of the alleged conspiracy against him, "Defendants tried to have
[Mr. Bates's] broker's license removed, improperly and under improper pretense using
said administrative proceeding." (R. 315, ^ 322; accordR. 319,fflf343-44; R. 322-23, fflf
366-68; R. 326, f 391; R. 327, Tf 397.)
Despite his express reliance on the defendants' alleged petitioning activities to
support each of his causes of action, Mr. Bates essentially now asks this Court to sever
such allegations from his Second Amended Complaint to allow his claims to go forward
based solely on certain alleged non-petitioning activities. However, as recognized by
Westlands Water District Distribution District v. Natural Resources Defense Council,

Although Mr. Bates's first four causes of action also expressly rely on the
administrative proceeding, Mr. Bates has conceded that those claims are barred by the
applicable statute of limitations. (Brief of Appellant at 13.)
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276 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (E.D. Ca. 2003), "Noerr immunity bars any claim, federal or state,
common law or statutory, that has as its gravamen constitutionally-protected petitioning
activity." Id. at 1053 (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, Mr. Bates cannot sever
or parse out that conduct from the remaining allegations in the Second Amended
Complaint, and this Court should affirm the district court's dismissal of Mr. Bates's Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Causes of Action pursuant to the Noerr-Pennington
Doctrine.
2.

The petition was directed towards the government.

Mr. Bates relies upon Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S.
492 (1988), to support his contention that the UDRE—the entity which received the
complaint to revoke Mr. Bates's license—was not really functioning as a governmental
entity for purposes of Noerr-Pennington/ihe First Amendment but, rather, a "captive"
agency of the UAR. However, as demonstrated below, Mr. Bates's imaginative reliance
on A Hied Tube is misplaced.
In Allied Tube, the National Fire Protection Association, which was a "private,
voluntary organization with more than 31,500 individual and group members
representing industry, labor, academia, insurers, organized medicine, firefighters, and
government," published product standards and codes, including the National Electrical
Code, "which establishes product and performance requirements for the design and
installation of electrical wiring systems." Id. at 495. Although the National Electrical
Code was routinely adopted "into law with little or no change" by a number of state and
local governments, id., the Court refused to hold that the Association should be treated as
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a "quasi-legislative body/' declaring, "[w]hatever de facto authority the Association
enjoys, no official authority has been conferred on it by any government, and the
decisionmaking body of the Association is composed, at least in part, of persons with
economic incentives to restrain trade." Id. at 501. The Court continued as follows:
The dividing line between restraints resulting from governmental action
and those resulting from private action may not always be obvious. But
where, as here, the restraint is imposed by persons unaccountable to the
public and without official authority, many of whom have personal
financial interests in restraining competition, we have no difficulty
concluding that the restraint has resulted from private action.
M a t 501-02.
Mr. Bates argues that Allied Tube should be applied because the Utah Real Estate
Commission, the UDRE's governing body, allegedly consisted of members that were
previously associated with Defendant UAR, were members of the UAR,8 or were
competitors of Mr. Bates. However, these arguments fail for a number of reasons.
Chief among them is the fact that Mr. Bates fails to challenge the district court's
findings that the UDRE "is a governmental entity that regulates and licenses all real
estate professionals in the State of Utah," that it "had the power and the ability to
discipline [Mr.] Bates and to revoke his license," and that it "had the power to grant the
relief allegedly sought by Defendants." (R. 1535.)9

It should be noted that these allegations fail to appear in the Second Amended
Complaint.
The district court was authorized to take judicial notice of such findings. See Utah R.
Evid.201.
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Unlike the wholly private trade association in Allied Tube, the UDRE is a state
agency created by statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-201. Pursuant to Section 61-2201, the UDRE is responsible for "the administration and enforcement" of the Real Estate
Licensing and Practices Act and Chapter 2 of Title 61 of the Utah Code. See id. The
UDRE is also responsible for investigating and enforcing adherence to the laws and rules
applicable to real estate agents and brokers, such as Utah Admin. Code R162-2f-401b,
which defines prohibited conduct for all licensed individuals, as well as for evaluating
and investigating complaints made against licensed individuals. See R162-2f-402. Thus,
unlike in Allied Tube, the UDRE has "official authority ... conferred on it by [the]
government."

486 U.S. at 501. Consequently, the defendants' alleged petitions to the

UDRE unquestionably fall within the definition of petitioning activity for purposes of the
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine.
As the district court correctly concluded, "[t]hat members of the Utah Real Estate
Commission are also members of UAR does not change the governmental nature of the
UDRE administrative proceedings any more than a judge's membership in the Utah State
Bar Association changes the governmental character of legal proceedings." (R. 1535.)
Additionally, to the extent Mr. Bates is arguing that the governmental character of the
UDRE was transformed because members of the UDRE were allegedly conspiring with
the defendants (or vice versa), it must be remembered that there is no conspiracy
exception to Noerr--Pennington immunity, even when it is alleged that "governmental
officials conspire with a private party to employ government action as a means of stifling
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competition."10 Omni, 499 U.S. at 382-83. "For purposes of Noerr-Pennington, there is
no distinction between petitioning governmental officials and conspiring with them." GF
Gaming Corp. v. City of Black Hawk, 405 F.3d 876, 883-84 (10th Cir. 2005). Thus, Mr.
Bates's claims of conspiracy and/or bias11 are insufficient to overcome the immunity
afforded the UAR and Mr. Kyler under the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine.
D.

The district court correctly concluded that the sham exception to
Noerr-Pennington immunity was inapplicable.

There is a limited exception to Noerr-Pennington/Fivst Amendment immunity
known as the "sham" exception. To come within the sham exception, a plaintiff must
show that (a) the underlying petition was "objectively baseless in the sense that no
reasonable litigant could realistically expect success" on the merits, Prof I Real Estate

.

Mr. Bates also argues that the UDRE acted outside the scope of its authority by
conducting its investigation when, according to Mr. Bates, it had no subject matter
jurisdiction. However, as noted elsewhere in this brief, the UDRE had probable cause to
investigate and bring a complaint against Mr. Bates.
11

Mr. Bates's claims of conspiracy and bias among and between the Utah Real Estate
Commission members is unfounded as shown by the fact that the ALJ's recommendation
was upheld by the very individuals that Mr. Bates now claims were biased against him
and involved in the conspiracy to deprive him of his license. (Compare R. 1169-1170
(listing the following members of the Commission as adopting the recommended order of
dismissal issued by the ALJ: Doyle C. "Sam" Sampson, Jr., Gary R. Hancock, H. Blaine
Walker, Kay R. Ashton, and Stefanie Tugaw-Madsen) with Brief of Appellant at 26
(listing the following individuals as members of the UAR: Doyle C. "Sam" Sampson Jr.,
Gary Hancock, H. Blaine Walker, Kay R. Ashton, and Stefanie Tugaw-Madsen). Mr.
Bates, himself, recognizes, he was ultimately successful in obtaining a Recommended
Order from the ALJ to dismiss the complaint against him. (See Conclusions of Law and
Recommended Order on Pending Motions, R. 1145-68.) The Commission unanimously
adopted this recommendation. Because the decision of such individuals to uphold the
ALJ's decision was in favor of Mr. Bates, Mr. Bates cannot claim "any actionable harm."
BCD, LLC v. BMW Mfg. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7410, at *47 (D.S.C. Jan. 31, 2008).
(A copy of the BCD opinion is attached hereto as Addendum B.)
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Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993); and that (b) the
underlying petition was brought with the subjective intent to harm the plaintiff rather than
to procure the relief sought in the petition. See id. at 61 ("Under this second part of our
definition of sham, the court should focus on whether the baseless lawsuit conceals 'an
attempt to interfere directly ...' through the 'use [of] the governmental process—as
opposed to the outcome of that process—as an anticompetitive weapon.'") (quoted
reference omitted); Anderson, 2005 UT 36 at fflf 27-28 (holding that a sham petition is
one "designed solely to harass" and not "genuinely designed to achieve the[] desired
outcome" of the petition).
The sham exception analysis is sequential.

Consequently, if the Court can

conclude that a petition is reasonably calculated to elicit a favorable outcome, the petition
is immunized under Noerr-Pennington, and a "claim premised on the sham exception
must fail" regardless of the petitioner's intent in bringing the petition. Prof I Real Estate
Investors, 508 U.S. at 60. "Only if challenged litigation is objectively meritless may a
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court examine the litigant's subjective motivation." Id.

In short, '"[t]he right of the people to inform their representative in government of their
desires with respect to the passage or enforcement of laws cannot properly be made to
depend upon their intent in doing so.'" Id. at 58 (quoted reference omitted). If a party
has the right to bring an objectively legitimate petition, they may do so regardless of
motive. Consequently, "a successful 'effort to influence governmental action ...
certainly cannot be characterized as a sham.'" Id. (quoted reference omitted). According
to Professional Real Estate Investors, "[W]e have repeatedly reaffirmed that evidence of
anticompetitive intent or purpose alone cannot transform otherwise legitimate activity
into a sham." Id. at 59. "[T]he legality of objectively reasonable petitioning 'directed
toward obtaining governmental action' is 'not at all affected by any ... purpose [the
actor] may have had.'" Id. (quoted reference omitted). A court can determine that a
governmental petition was objectively reasonable "as a matter of law." Id. at 63.
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As the following subsections demonstrate, the sham exception does not apply
because the UDRE complaint was not objectively meritless and the underlying petition
was brought with the intent to procure the relief sought in the petition.
1.

The UDRE complaint was not objectively meritless.

Under the objective prong of the sham exception, the Court must analyze whether
the underlying petition constituted the pursuit of claims so baseless that no reasonable
litigant could have realistically expected to secure favorable relief. Prof I Real Estate
Investors, 508 U.S. at 62. This is essentially a probable cause inquiry. Indeed, "[t]he
existence of probable cause to institute legal proceedings precludes a finding that [a] ...
defendant has engaged in sham litigation."

Id.

"Probable cause to institute civil

proceedings requires no more than a 'reasonable] belie[f] that there is a chance that [a]
claim may be held valid upon adjudication.'" Id. at 62-63 (quoting Hubbard v. Beatty &
Hyde, Inc., 178 N.E.2d 485, 488 (Mass. 1961) (alterations in original)). "Where, as here,
there is no dispute over the predicate facts of the underlying legal proceeding, a court
may decide probable cause as a matter of law." Id. at 63.
Disregarding the claims in his Second Amended Complaint that the defendants
petitioned the UDRE for the sole purpose of obtaining the revocation of his license, Mr.
Bates now argues that the Administrative Law Judge's decision that the UDRE lacked
subject matter jurisdiction is dispositive as to the issue of whether the defendants'
petitioning activities were a sham. However, as counseled by the United States Supreme
Court, a failure to achieve the desired governmental outcome, alone, cannot transform the
activity into a sham. Prof I Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 60 n.5 ("[W]hen the
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antitrust defendant has lost the underlying litigation [or action], a court must resist the
understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that an
ultimately unsuccessful action must have been unreasonable or without foundation. The
court must remember that even when the law or the facts appear questionable or
unfavorable at the outset, a party may have an entirely reasonable ground for bringing
suit." (internal quotations and citations omitted)); see also Havoco of America, Ltd. v.
Hollobow, 702 F.2d 643, 651 (7th Cir. 1983) ("That they were unsuccessful does not
automatically transform their attempt into a sham.").
Although the ALJ ultimately ruled that the UDRE lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to investigate the conduct of Mr. Bates relating to his alleged
misappropriation of commissions, such a ruling does not support the conclusion that the
defendants' alleged petitioning activities were a sham. As held by the district court,
below, "[t]o determine whether the UDRE complaint was objectively baseless, it is
important to understand the statutory and administrative framework within which the
complaint was filed." (R. 1536.) Explaining the statutory provisions governing a real
estate broker and his duties to a real estate agent, the district court explained:
Under Utah's statutory framework, all principal brokers are required to be
licensed by UDRE. Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-5.5 (2008). Utah law requires
UDRE to "require and pass upon proof necessary to determine the honesty,
integrity, truthfulness, reputation, and competency of each applicant for an
initial license or for renewal of an existing license." Id. § 61-2-6(l)(b).
Under Utah's statutory scheme, no real estate activity is authorized unless
undertaken by the principal broker or an individual affiliated with a
principal broker. In fact, real estate agents are at the mercy of their
principal broker for payment and collection of real estate commissions
because, under Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-18(2), "[n]o sales agent or associate
broker may sue in his own name for the recovery of a fee, commission, or
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compensation for services as a sales agent or associate broker...." An
action for the recovery of a fee, commission, or other compensation may be
instituted and brought only by the licensed principal broker with whom a
sales agent or associate broker is affiliated. Id. § 61-2-18(1). If an agent is
not paid an earned commission, his only recourse is to sue his principal
broker. See id. § 61-2-18(2). This places the principal broker in a
fiduciary-like relation to his agents regarding payment of earned real estate
commissions.
(R. 1536-37.)
To protect both real estate agents and the general public, Section 61-2-11 of the
Utah Code sets forth several grounds for disciplining a principal real estate broker, like
Mr. Bates, including for "failing, within a reasonable time, to account for or to remit
monies coming into the person's possession that belong to others," Utah Code Ann. §612-ll(6)(a); "diverting monies ... from the purpose for which they were received," id. §
61-2-1 l(6)(c); "being unworthy or incompetent to act as a principal broker, associate
broker, or sales agent in such manner as to safeguard the interests of the public," id. §612-11(8); "any other conduct which constitutes dishonest dealing," id. § 61-2-11(17);
"unprofessional conduct," id. § 61-2-11(18); and "violating an independent contractor
agreement between a principal broker and a sales agent as evidenced by a final judgment
of a court," id. §61-2-11(22).
Despite these broad statutory provisions, however, the ALJ nevertheless ruled that
the UDRE lacked subject matter jurisdiction to investigate allegations that Mr. Bates
failed to pay his real estate agents' commissions. Indeed, although the UDRE alleged
that Mr. Bates's deliberate failure to pay his real estate agents their earned commissions
violated eight separate provisions of Section 61-2-11, the ALJ concluded that the UDRE
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"lack[ed] subject matter jurisdiction as to those allegations and claims" because they "are
all premised on conduct allegedly taken by [Mr. Bates] as to payment of commissions to
sales agents." (R. 1166.) This conclusion was based solely on the ALJ's application of
Rule Rl 62-7-1, which provided that "[t]he Division will not entertain complaints
between licensees regarding claims to commissions"

Utah Admin. Code Rl62-7-1

(2008) (emphasis added).
However, as noted by the district court, the ALJ's application of Rl62-7-1 is
questionable given that the UDRE petition "did not constitute a complaint 'between
licensees regarding claims to commissions'" when the "only licensee that was a party to
the complaint was [Mr.] Bates," (R. 1538), and the UDRE proceeding "was strictly a
licensing proceeding" that did not contain a claim for "monetary relief ... sought by
another licensee" seeking payment of his/her commission. {Id.)

As demonstrated by the amendment to Rule Rl62-7-1 in 2009, the ALJ's ruling
erroneously interpreted R162-7-1. Rule R162-7-1, as amended, provides as follows:
An aggrieved person may file a complaint in writing against a licensee; or
the Division or Commission may initiate an investigation for an alleged
violation of the provisions of these rules or of Utah Code Annotated Section
61-2-1, et seq. The Division may only entertain a complaint between
licensees regarding commissions if the complaint alleges, or the Division
suspects, a specific violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 61-2-11 or
Section Rl62-6-1.
Utah Admin. Code Rl 62-7-1 (2009) (Addendum A.) The UDRE amended the Rule to
"clarif[y] that the [UDRE] may investigate violations of prohibited conduct under statute
or rule even if the complaint is related to a commission dispute." (Addendum A.) The
amendment further clarifies that, although the UDRE "will not adjudicate the
[commission] dispute," it "may take action for otherwise prohibited conduct." (Id.)
Because an agency's interpretation of its own rules will be upheld absent a
"determination [that it] exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality," McBride
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In short, the ALJ erroneously ignored the obvious conclusion that when the
principal broker of Utah's largest brokerage deliberately and admittedly withholds
monies due his agents, diverting those monies elsewhere, that he may be guilty of failing
"to account for or to remit monies ... that belong to others," Utah Code Ann. § 61-21 l(6)(a); "diverting monies ... from the purpose for which they were received," id. § 612-ll(6)(c); "being unworthy or incompetent to act as a principal broker," id. § 61-211(8); "dishonest dealing," id. § 61-2-11(17); or "unprofessional conduct," id. § 61-211(18).
But, regardless of whether the ALJ's interpretation of Rule Rl 62-7-1 was correct,
it is beyond dispute that Mr. Bates's admitted non-payment of commissions and the
admitted negative publicity it garnered gave the defendants probable cause to initiate the
UDRE complaint against Mr. Bates under the statutory framework governing the conduct
of real estate brokers in Utah. Accordingly, Mr. Bates cannot demonstrate that the
defendants' petitions to the UDRE to remedy Mr. Bates's violations of Section 61-2-11
were "objectively baseless" under the Professional Real Estate Investors test.
2.

The underlying petition was brought with the intent to
procure the relief sought in the petition.

Finally, even assuming Mr. Bates was able to demonstrate that the administrative
proceedings were objectively baseless (which he cannot do), Mr. Bates is still unable to
establish the second prong of the sham test because he cannot show the administrative
v. Motor Vehicle Div., 1999 UT 9,If12, 977 P.2d 467, this Court should conclude that the
UDRE did, in fact, have jurisdiction to investigate allegations that Mr. Bates's conduct in
failing to pay commissions due and owing to his real estate agents constituted a violation
of Section 61-2-11.
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proceedings were brought with the subjective intent to harm him rather than to procure
the relief sought in the complaint.
The Second Amended Complaint unquestionably alleged that the defendants'
petitions to the UDRE were for the purpose of obtaining the revocation of Mr. Bates's
license. (See, e.g., R. 315, M 322 ("Defendants tried to have the Plaintiffs broker's
license removed, improperly and under improper pretense using said administrative
proceeding."); accord R. 319,fflf343-44; R. 322-23, tlf 366-68; R. 326, t 391; R. 327, \
397.) Because such allegations clearly establish that defendants' alleged conduct was
"genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action," the sham exception does
not apply. Anderson Dev. Co., 2005 UT 36 at ^ 27.
Accordingly, even if the defendants were found to have used "improper means" to
achieve the revocation of Mr. Bates's license, such a finding would "not be sufficient to
except [them] from the immunity provided under the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine in light
of their uncontested intent to achieve a favorable governmental result." Id. at If 28. Thus,
this Court should affirm the district court's dismissal of Mr. Bates's claims against the
defendants.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING MAY ALSO BE AFFIRMED ON
ALTERNATE GROUNDS.
Lastly, because Mr. Bates failed to adequately plead his Second Amended

Complaint to properly distinguish among the numerous defendants, this Court may also
affirm the district court's ruling on alternate grounds.
Indeed, it is well established that an appellate court may affirm the
judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory
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apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that
stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true
even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on appeal by
appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or
passed on by the lower court.
First Equity Fed., Inc. v. Phillips Dev., LC, 2002 UT 56,1f 11, 52 P.3d 1137.
As set forth in the UAR's and Mr. Kyler's Motion to Dismiss, (R. 1137-40), Rule
8(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires a plaintiff to set forth "a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The purpose of
this rule is to "give the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the
claim." Utah Steel & Iron Co. v. Bosch, 475 P.2d 1019, 1020 (Utah 1970); see also
Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, Tf 23, 79 P.3d 974 ("The objective of these rules
[Rules 8(a) and 9(b)] is to require that the essential facts upon which redress is sought be
set forth with simplicity, brevity, clarity and certainty so that it can be determined
whether there exists a legal basis for the relief claimed."); accord Robbins v. Okla. ex rel.
Dep't of Human Servs., 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that the purpose of
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is "to provide fair notice of the grounds
for the claims made against each of the defendants").14
Therefore, the sufficiency of a complaint "must be determined by the facts pleaded
rather than the conclusions stated." Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints, 2001 UT 25,1 26, 21 P.3d 198 (quotations and citations omitted). Indeed, Utah's
appellate courts "have stressed, and continue to hold, that mere conclusory allegations in
14

"Interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are persuasive where the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure are 'substantially similar' to the federal rules." Tucker v. State
Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, ^j 7 n. 2, 53 P.3d 947 (citation omitted).
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a pleading, unsupported by a recitation of relevant surrounding facts, are insufficient to
preclude" dismissal. Id. at ^ 36 (internal quotations omitted); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if
it tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement." (internal quotations
and citations omitted)). Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has always cautioned
that even the deferential Rule 12(b)(6) standards do not allow the court to assume that a
plaintiff "can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the ..
. laws in ways that have not been alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors v.. Cal. State
Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983) (footnote omitted).
The Second Amended Complaint asserts nine separate causes of action against 13
named defendants and 60 "Doe" defendants. The claims asserted include four theories of
defamation, a claim for civil conspiracy, two varieties of tortious interference with
economic relations, and a statutory claim for unfair business practices. The Second
Amended Complaint contains a total of 403 separate paragraphs, spanning 69 pages. For
the most part, the Second Amended Complaint takes a shotgun approach to liability,
failing to differentiate the conduct of the defendants, and tying the liability of all
defendants to the specific actions of some defendants under broad strokes of agency.
However, as in Robbins, "[g]iven the complaint's use of either the collective term
'Defendants' or a list of the defendants named individually but with no distinction as to
what acts are attributable to whom, it is impossible for any of these individuals to
ascertain what particular . . . acts they are alleged to have committed." 519 F.3d at 1250;
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see also Cline v. Brown, 2008 UT App 319, at *2-3 (unpublished) (dismissing complaint
as against an individual defendant when the complaint, which consisted "of eighty-nine
separately numbered paragraphs covering thirty-six pages," included "only two
paragraphs, covering less than a page ... to the alleged conduct" of the individual
defendant, and it "assert[ed] no facts that, if proven to be true, could substantiate th[e]
uncorroborated legal conclusion").
And the bald assertions of agency that so predominate the Second Amended
Complaint do not relieve Mr. Bates's of his obligation to plead "relevant surrounding
facts" as required by Franco. "A complaint relying on agency must plead facts which, if
proved, could establish the existence of an agency relationship. It is insufficient to merely
plead the legal conclusions of agency." Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 990 F. Supp. 551,
554 (N.D. 111. 1997) (internal quotations omitted); accord Lachmund v. ADM Investors
Servs., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1114 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (holding that legal conclusion that
partner in business was the agent of another company was insufficient allegation of
agency); MJ& Partners Rest. Ltd. P'ship v. Zadikoff, 10 F. Supp. 2d 922, 931 (N.D. 111.
1998) ("While the existence and extent of the agency relationship is a question of fact,
the plaintiff must sufficiently allege that an agency relationship existed in order for his
complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss."); Prochaska & Assoc, v. Merrill
Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 798 F. Supp. 1427, 1433 (D. Neb. 1992) (holding that
"bald" allegation of agency "is by itself a mere legal conclusion and is therefore
insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss").
There are simply no facts demonstrating agency alleged in the Second Amended
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Complaint. Nor are there factual allegations (as opposed to legal conclusions) pleaded
against Mr. Kyler and the UAR sufficient to allow Mr. Bates's claims to go forward.
Consequently, this Court should affirm the district court's dismissal of Mr. Bates's claims
against the UAR and Mr. Kyler.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing and the arguments and briefs of the other Appellees, in
which the UAR and Mr. Kyler hereby join, the ruling of the district court should be
affirmed.
Dated this 19th day of July, 2012,
MCDONALD FIELDING,
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2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7410, *2

(Written Opinion)
This matter is before the Court on: (1) the motion for
summary judgment filed by Defendant BMW
Manufacturing Co., LLC ("BMW") on October 4, 2007,
and (2) the motion for partial summary judgment filed by
Plaintiffs on October 30, 2007. After carefully
considering the motions and memoranda filed in support
thereof, the Court hereby GRANTS BMW's Motion for
Summary Judgment and DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment for the reasons stated below.
I. FACTS
This lawsuit arises out of what is now referred to as
Clemson's CU-ICAR campus. [ Dating back to 1992,
BMW and Clemson University ("Clemson") worked
together on education goals. As early as 2001, Clemson
was separately exploring the development of a wind
tunnel which would cater to the racing industry. In July
2001, Dr. Chris Przirembel of Clemson made a formal
presentation of the wind tunnel to BMW's President, Dr.
Helmut Leube. Dr. Leube supported the idea of educating
[*3] potential automotive engineers at Clemson, but
indicated that BMW was not interested in funding a wind
tunnel. After the meeting, Dr. Leube wrote South
Carolina Secretary of Commerce Charles Way, proposing
to "[establish a Center of Automotive Technology in
partnership with Clemson University" and calling upon
the State and BMW to "jointly do what will be required
to turn [the opportunities] into reality." (Exhibit 6 to
Memorandum in Support of BMW's Motion for
Summary Judgment.) The center referenced by Leube
would ultimately become the Carroll A. Campbell, Jr.
Graduate Engineering Center ("GEC"). Neither BMW,
Clemson, nor the State had selected a site for the GEC.
1 The parties have submitted over 3,500 pages
into the record before the Court, including
excerpts from the more than fifty (50) depositions
taken by the parties. The Court has reviewed the
entire record submitted by the parties. The
following summary is by no means a complete
recitation of all evidence considered by the Court;
rather, it is a basic summary intended to provide
the factual setting for the legal rulings in this
Order.
A potential site for the separate wind tunnel had been
identified by local leaders in Greenville [*4] on property
owned by the late textile magnate John Hollingsworth.

To serve as the potential developer of the wind tunnel,
Clemson contacted Clifford Rosen, the principal behind
each of the Plaintiff entities. On August 31, 2001, Rosen
wrote Clemson expressing his interest in developing an
'off campus" facility known as the "Clemson University
Center for Motor Sports Excellence." (Ex. 8 to BMW's
Memorandum.) By late 2001, Rosen had learned of
BMW's negotiations with the State for a State-funded
initiative that might benefit Clemson. Rosen was
introduced by Clemson officials to the Hollingsworth
organization and immediately began negotiating a land
purchase.
On January 23, 2002, Rosen, through Plaintiff BCD,
LLC, entered into a contract (the "Hollingsworth
Contract") to acquire rights to a 407-acre parcel in
Greenville County, adjacent to Interstate 85 (the
"Hollingsworth Property"). By this point, Rosen had
begun negotiations with Clemson, assuring Dr.
Przirembel by letter dated January 2, 2002 that: (1) Rosen
would donate 25 acres to a charitable organization, (2)
that Rosen would "coordinate and provide all financing
and equity funding needed to develop the wind tunnel,"
and (3) that [*5] "Clemson University will have no
financial or legal responsibility to Rosen whatsoever."
(Ex. 15 to BMW's Memorandum.) Rosen expressed that
Clemson's trademark "may" be licensed to "the Charity"
for use "as part of the Facility and its educational and
research programs." Id.
The identified charity was a subsidiary of the
Clemson University Foundation ("CUF") called AMREC,
LLC ("AMREC"). Rosen formed Plaintiff CR-MERC,
LLC ("CR-MERC"), and on April 4, 2002, AMREC and
CR-MERC signed a nine-page "Agreement" (the "April
2002 Agreement") in an attempt to establish an AMREC
campus centered around a wind tunnel on the
Hollingsworth Property. (Ex. 17 to BMW's
Memorandum.) The AMREC campus was to consist of a
combination of parcels, some purchased by AMREC,
some donated by Rosen. Rosen was to be the exclusive
developer of the AMREC campus and was to receive
development and management fees if projects were
developed by him on the AMREC campus.
The April 2002 Agreement called for negotiations on
twelve (12) other subject areas (identified as "Exhibits")
to be completed by May 1, 2002. Id. These identified
subject areas for the required Exhibits included the
material aspects of the deal, such as [*6] how the land
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would be divided, how the land would be developed, and
what the development could look like. Any modification
of the April 2002 Agreement was required to be made in
a signed writing. Paragraph 10 of the April 2002
Agreement provided that:
Failure to Agree Upon Exhibits. In the
event that AMREC and CR-MERC are
unable to agree to any of the Exhibits to be
attached to this Agreement, then at any
time after May 1, 2002, either party, may,
upon ten (10) days notice to the other
party, cancel this Agreement, whereupon
the parties shall be relieved of all
obligations to each other.
Id. Between April 4, 2002 and May 1, 2002, Clemson and
Rosen worked to develop agreements which would
address the identified subject areas for the Exhibits. The
parties signed Exhibits in some subject areas, but did not
complete signed documents for all of the Exhibits. Most
significantly, the parties did not sign a document
covering the subject matter designated as falling under
"Exhibit G" by the April 2002 Agreement, which was the
only document setting forth what parcels of real estate the
parties were to receive. Id. To complete Exhibit G, the
April 2002 Agreement required that the parties agree
[*7] and make a "designation" of what parcels would
comprise the "[20 acre] Donated Parcel, the [5 acre]
Wind Tunnel Parcel and the remaining seventy-five (75)
gross acres from which the Option Parcel may be
created." Id. In sum, the parties were required to agree on
the specific land that would comprise a total of 100 acres
that Clemson could acquire through AMREC under the
agreement.
The April 2002 Agreement also called for two
different Exhibits related to what could and could not be
built on the property: (1) a "Reciprocal Easement and
Operating Agreement" ("REA") which would govern
only what could be built on the eventual 100 acre
AMREC Campus; and (2) a "Master Association
Agreement" which would govern what Rosen could build
on his remaining acreage surrounding the campus. Id.
The parties did not sign any document comprising these
identified subject areas by May 1, 2002. In an effort to
address this subject area, Rosen's attorney suggested
combining these two exhibits into one agreement called a
"Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions, and
Easements" ("CCR"):

This document is meant to cover the
subject areas defined in the AMREC
Agreement as Exhibits F and H. As I
previously [*8] discussed with you, upon
reflection in drafting this document we
thought it best to cover subject matters
contemplated by Exhibits F and H in this
one document. This will necessitate of
course, an addendum to the AMREC
Agreement.
(Ex. 23 to BMW's Memorandum.) There is no signed
writing in the record embodying agreement to the
combined document Rosen's attorney proposed, nor is
there any "addendum" to reflect some other agreement.
After May 1, 2002, AMREC Attorney John
Campbell's office caused a binder of the existing
agreements to be assembled and, on May 8, 2002, sent
the binder to Rosen's attorneys. Campbell's staff created
lettered tabs for each Exhibit required by the April 2002
Agreement, and a cover sheet for each such Exhibit.
Behind the cover sheet for Exhibit G, they placed an
artistic rendering of the entire site which had no
designation of parcels. Behind the tabs for Exhibits F and
H, they placed a sheet that contained the words "NOT
USED." (Ex. 28 to BMW's Memorandum.) The sheets of
paper that said "NOT USED" were not presented to any
party as a contractual document, nor signed.
The record reflects that Rosen's attorneys
immediately began revising the agreements as early [*9]
as May 2, 2002. As early as May 7, 2002, Rosen's
attorneys began creating a revised "Amended and
Restated Master Agreement" which reflected the
conversion of Exhibits F and H to a CCR. (Atlass Dep. p.
58-59, Ex. 25 to BMW's Memorandum; Abbott Dep. p.
41, Ex. 24 to BMW's Memorandum.) It is undisputed that
the parties did not sign a CCR or any other document
purporting to agree to a CCR at that time. Indeed, the
record reflects an ongoing state of negotiation and
revision of the various documents.
The License Agreement between AMREC and
CR-MERC, which governs the use of the Clemson
trademark, was contingent upon the existence of an
agreed CCR (the subject matter of Exhibits F and H).
Schedule 4 of the License Agreement 2 indicates "[t]he
development of the Campus shall not deviate from the
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requirements of the Declaration of Covenants,
Conditions, Restrictions, and Easements" (i.e. the CCR).
(Ex. 30 to BMW's Memorandum.) Section 12(p) of the
License Agreement provided it could be terminated if the
parties did not include certain protective provisions in the
CCR. 3 Id.
2 The Clemson trademark was licensed to Rosen
through two companion agreements: (1) an
agreement between Clemson University [*10]
and AMREC, and (2) an agreement between
AMREC and CR-MERC. The relevant provisions
discussed herein appear in both agreements.
3 In his affidavit, Rosen attorney Eliot Abbott
states that this requirement was a "non-issue"
because the required language appeared in the
many drafts of the CCR, and in the absence of
Exhibit F the language of Paragraph 4 of the April
4, 2002 Agreement would restrict the use of the
property. (Elliott Aff. PP 9-11) However,
Paragraph 4 only discusses restrictions on the
AMREC campus; Paragraph 6 requires an
agreement which will "govern the use" of the
adjoining land retained by CR-MERC, but
provides no substantive language about what
could or could not be built on the non-Clemson,
non-AMREC portion of the land. (Ex. 17 to
BMW's Memorandum.) Moreover, the License
Agreement refers to an operative CCR, not a
draft.
While Rosen, AMREC, and Clemson were working
on the various agreements, State legislative developments
opened up a political funding avenue for the GEC being
discussed separately between BMW and Clemson. On
May 15, 2002, the State General Obligation Economic
Development Bond Act (the "Bond Act") was passed.
S.C. Code Ann. §11-41-10 et. seq. The Bond [*11] Act
allowed the State to fund infrastructure projects that
would support identified economic development in South
Carolina. BMW proposed to make a major investment in
South Carolina and identified the GEC as one of the
infrastructure projects to potentially receive funding
under the Bond Act. As a precursor to State bond
funding, the Bond Act requires BMW (the "sponsor") to
invest $ 400 million and create 400 jobs in South
Carolina (the "economic development project"). S.C.
Code Ann. §11-41-30. Upon this condition, the State may
pay for "infrastructure" that "must relate specifically to,
but is not required to be located at, the economic

development project." Id. The proposed infrastructure
project must be approved by the Secretary of Commerce,
the Joint Bond Review Committee and the State Budget
and Control Board (which is chaired by the Governor).
Id. BMW and the State negotiated in the Summer of 2002
on State financial support for the BMW initiative; by July
29, 2002, Secretary Way had formally proposed BMW
incentives funded by bonds, which included $ 25 million
earmarked for Clemson for a "graduate automotive
engineering education and training center." [*12] (Ex. 32
to BMW's Memorandum.)
After the passage of the Bond Act, Rosen lobbied the
State to fund the wind tunnel project. Rosen met with
Governor Hodges in the Summer of 2002. On June 24,
2002, Rosen and his attorneys met with Dr. Jim Morris,
Chief of Staff at the South Carolina Department of
Commerce ("SCDOC"). At that meeting, Rosen sought
State funding for the wind tunnel. Dr. Morris told Rosen
that the State would not fund a wind tunnel, and that the
SCDOC was instead considering funding the GEC. After
learning this, Rosen sought to secure the funded GEC for
his site. On July 1, 2002, Rosen wrote Dr. Przirembel of
Clemson that "[m]y meeting with Commerce has
convinced me that it will be useful to begin the process of
designing and developing Clemson's new graduate
education facility." (Ex. 37 to BMW's Memorandum.)
Rosen asked Dr. Przirembel for a written commitment for
the GEC to be located on his site. The record reveals that
there was no obligation by Clemson, BMW or the State
to locate the GEC on the Hollingsworth Property, or even
to create the GEC.
In July 2002, BMW began discussions with Clemson
about a site for the GEC. On July 19, 2002, BMW
learned that Clemson was proposing [*13] an off campus
site, the Hollingsworth Property controlled by Rosen, for
consideration as the site for the GEC. Shortly thereafter,
Rosen sought to convince BMW that it should locate on
the Hollingsworth Property. On or about July 30, 2002,
Rosen's representative Bill Thompson hosted Craig
Arnold of BMW at a meeting, which Thompson
described as a "pitch" to BMW. (Thompson Dep. p.
38-39, Ex. 43 to BMW's Memorandum.) Thompson
testified that he viewed BMW as a potential anchor
tenant for the development, and that "you listen to what
the anchor tenant has to say. You may not do it, you may
negotiate about what the terms are, but you listen."
(Thompson Dep. p.29, Ex. 43 to BMW's Memorandum.)
At the meeting, Arnold told Thompson that the GEC
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could be located on the main Clemson campus and asked
about other available land in the area. Thompson knew
that the negotiations to follow the July meeting with
Arnold were intended to address whether the GEC would
go on the parcel that Rosen then controlled:
Q: And Mr. Thompson, that was an
issue that began that day and continued
throughout the negotiations^] wasn't it?
Are we going to locate it on this property
or is there other land available where
[*14] we can put this school?
A: That was always Clemson's option.
(Thompson Dep. p.51, Ex. 43 to BMW's Memorandum.)
Thompson told BMW to address its concerns about the
GEC directly with Clemson. However, Arnold raised
numerous issues directly to Thompson that BMW would
repeatedly raise with Clemson during negotiations in the
year to come, including: (1) that the education function of
the school was important to BMW as a potential source
of engineers in South Carolina; (2) that the development
next to the GEC should be consistent with a college
campus environment, and not a "shopping center"
(Thompson Dep. p.34-35, Ex. 43 to BMW's
Memorandum); and (3) that the identified site might not
be big enough.
Thompson and Arnold had discussions about the
design standards for the proposed campus, the
development fees, and the land restrictions. Thompson
invited Arnold to review certain documents to address the
issues Arnold had raised. After the meeting, Thompson
sent Arnold a letter dated August 2, 2002 with a selection
of the various documents. There is no evidence in the
record that BMW ever received the April 2002
Agreement or all of its then-existing Exhibits. In his
transmittal letter, Thompson [*15] said to Arnold:
"Based on our meeting it is apparent to me that my
company must reflect a spirit of flexibility in order to
meet BMW's needs." (Ex. 44 to BMW's Memorandum.)
With both Rosen and Clemson having pitched the
Hollingsworth Property as a potential site for the GEC,
BMW turned towards discussions with the SCDOC and
Clemson University regarding the conditions upon which
the GEC would proceed to the next step of government
approval under the Bond Act - certification by the
Secretary of Commerce, approval by the Joint Bond
Review Committee, and approval by the State Budget

and Control Board.
The first major meeting after the Hollingsworth site
had been formally pitched to BMW was on August 19,
2002. The meeting was between numerous
representatives of the SCDOC, Clemson, and BMW.
Prior to this meeting, Dr. Morris of the SCDOC stated
that it was necessary to think of the State-funded GEC
separately from the wind tunnel, and that "Rosen's name"
should not appear on the Clemson campus, as the campus
should reflect the State's involvement and funding.
(Leidinger Dep. p.46-49, Ex. 47 to BMW's
Memorandum.) At the meeting, the BMW representatives
raised numerous specific points, which [*16] related to
the issue of separating the State-owned GEC (and its
parcel) from the private development controlled by
Rosen. Towards this end, the participants discussed (1)
how the relationship could be carried out between
Clemson and BMW; (2) the necessary amount of acreage
to fall under the control of Clemson University; (3) how
the necessary
control
of the
State-funded,
Clemson-owned projects would be addressed with
Rosen's ownership and development rights; and (4)
whether the GEC should be located on another site or on
the main campus of Clemson. The Plaintiffs rely heavily
on notes taken during this period of time for statements
attributable to BMW, such as "There is no Miami
Developer who is going to tell us what to do" and
"Decouple Graduate Education Center sooner rather than
later." (Exhibit 10 to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment.)
After the meeting of August 19, 2002, Clemson's
Przirembel began drafting a "Memorandum of
Expectations between Clemson University and BMW."
(Exhibit 4 to Reply in Support of BMW's Motion for
Summary Judgment.) On August 26, a proposed draft
was delivered to Carl Flesher of BMW. Flesher returned
it on [*17] September 13 with requested changes,
including: "Clemson University will use its best efforts to
secure sole ownership and control, as soon as possible, of
100 or more buildable acres of land, unencumbered by
extraneous development costs or fees." (Ex. 20 to
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition.) The document
went on to say "BMW will obtain $ 25M from the State
of South Carolina through the Department of Commerce
to be used for the construction of [the GEC and] . . .
BMW will provide a $ 10M endowment for the support
of the operations of [the GEC]." Id. The document did
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not require any particular site for the GEC. Clemson gave
BMW assurances that it would attempt to meet BMW's
expectations. On September 26, 2002, the State of South
Carolina, BMW, and Clemson publicly announced both
the creation of the GEC and BMW's donation of $ 10
million to Clemson. The announcement did not make any
reference to a selected site for the GEC.
Clemson began negotiating with Rosen for a "carve
out" of a State-owned campus that would be totally
within Clemson's control and not subject to any
development rights or fees for Rosen. These discussions
culminated in a meeting between Rosen and a
subcommittee [*18] of the Clemson Board of Trustees,
at which Rosen made a presentation regarding his
"Response to Clemson regarding altering original
agreement to accommodate requests by BMW and
[Department of] Commerce." (Ex. 59 to BMW's
Memorandum.) In essence, Rosen proposed to sell
acreage at a higher price in exchange for removing his
exclusive development rights.
The parties began to discuss individual parcels and
prices for a contemplated closing in January 2003. It was
during this series of negotiations that Rosen submitted to
AMREC for the first time a proposed survey designating
what part of the Hollingsworth Property would constitute
the AMREC campus. Clemson objected to Rosen's
proposal, claiming that up to one-half of Clemson's
proposed property would be "under water," and that other
numerous features would affect the amount of buildable
acres for future campus development. (Campbell Dep.
p. 194-196, Ex. 18 to BMW's Memorandum.) In response,
Rosen argued in an email dated December 14, 2002, that
the proposal was a good deal for Clemson. He claimed
that in return for a proposed $ 4.7 million investment by
Clemson, Clemson would receive the $ 25 million GEC,
BMW's $ 10 million endowment, and [*19] the $ 12
million dollar, State-funded road that was proposed for
the property. Rosen concluded his response by inviting
Clemson to ask itself: "Can the acquisition of the total 40
acres be replaced with a more favorable transaction?"
(Ex. 62 to BMW's Memorandum.)
In November 2002, Mark Sanford won the South
Carolina gubernatorial election, defeating incumbent
Governor Jim Hodges. On December 12, 2002, the
parties met with Governor Sanford to solicit his support.
President Barker described the meeting and its
significance:

The meeting took place in Columbia.
Involved were Cliff Rosen, Chris
Przirembel, folks in the Department of
Commerce. I think Jim Morris was there. .
. . I had met [Governor Sanford] before
that but it was an effort to explain the
basic concept of the projectf,] what role
Clemson would play in it, what role BMW
would play in it[,] what role the Cliff
Rosen would play in it and I thought the
meeting was going very well. And then
there was a question the Governor asked.
It may have been the first question. I do
not remember but the question was
directly to Cliff Rosen what do you have
in this project[?] What is your role in this
project[?] What was your financial
commitment [*20] to this projectf?] And I
remember being absolutely shocked at the
idea that he did not really respond to that
question. And all I wanted him to say was
Governor we are going to commit to
building this wind tunnel[,] financing it[J
giving the land to Clemson and that is our
financial commitment to this project and
he did not do that. . . . He did not say that
he was committed to this project and the
financing of the wind tunnel. And I
remember the meeting having a
completely different tone after that.
(Barker Dep. 55-57, Ex. 2 to BMW's Memorandum.)
Rosen states in his affidavit that he told Governor
Sanford "I had $ 5 million invested with up to $ 25
million to be invested by way of cash and additional
guarantees on mortgages as I exercised my options under
the Hollingsworth Agreements." (Rosen Aff. P 17, Ex. 40
to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition.) Governor
Sanford testified that he was concerned about "how you'd
have at some level State money going into something but
no transparency as to whether or not that was indeed a
good deal or a bad deal." (Sanford Dep. pp. 15-16, Ex. 65
to BMW's Memorandum.) Governor Sanford asked Bob
Faith, his nominee for Secretary of Commerce who was
[*21] an experienced real estate developer, to investigate
the deal further to make sure that there was sufficient
value for the State.
Rosen's failure to mention the wind tunnel in his
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response to the Governor's questions began to concern
Clemson that Rosen would not deliver a wind tunnel. The
record reveals that progress on the wind tunnel began to
be an issue during this timeframe. On December 3, 2002,
Rosen sent his subcontractor MTS an order to "cease and
desist from any work in connection with the Rolling
Road System [for the wind tunnel] until further notice."
(Ex. 66 to BMW's Memorandum.) According to Clemson
representatives, Rosen told them in a meeting on January
10, 2003 that "he was not going to be able to transact the .
. . wind tunnel at this time because of a series of
complexities[.]" (Richardson Dep. p.226-229, Ex. 16 to
BMW's Memorandum.) This meeting became heated and
the Clemson representatives became upset. No one from
BMW was present at this meeting. Rosen says in his
affidavit that "I never told President Barker, Dr.
Przirembel, Dwight Drake, or anyone else that I would
not or could not build the wind tunnel." (Rosen Aff. P 5,
Ex. 40 to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition.) [*22]
Rosen states that instead, "I simply maintained that I
would not unconditionally guarantee its construction or
financing." Id.
Rosen's position on the wind tunnel culminated in a
letter to Clemson that he wrote on January 21, 2003. In
his letter, Rosen acknowledged that "Clemson perceives
that my organization has not fulfilled its commitment to
build the Wind Tunnel." (Ex. 43 to Plaintiffs'
Memorandum in Opposition.) Rosen indicated that the
viability of the wind tunnel project was in doubt and
blamed Clemson for the lack of progress on the wind
tunnel. Rosen claimed that Clemson had a duty to obtain
"pre-sales" for wind tunnel time from the racing teams
before he would proceed further on the wind tunnel. Id.
Without Clemson providing these presales, R.osen stated
that the "financial viability [of the wind tunnel] is
unknown." Id. Rosen wrote "the current status of the
'Wind Tunnel['] is not a result of any action or lack
thereof by my organization." Id. Rosen also touted the
involvement of BMW and the GEC as "miraculous
strides," and suggested that BMW's involvement "should
help you alleviate some concerns relating to the slow
progress on the commencement of construction of the
Wind [*23] Tunnel." Id.
According to President Barker, "it became pretty
clear . . . that the person that we had counted on to make
this wind tunnel a reality was saying he was not going to
do that so it had a major impact on all of us here."
(Barker Dep. p.65-67, Ex. 2 to BMW's Memorandum.)

President Barker testified that Rosen's wind tunnel letter
put the parties "back to square one" in the negotiation
process. Id. According to Clemson Trustee Bill Amick,
once Rosen took the wind runnel "off the table," the deal
would have to be renegotiated to reflect the lost value.
(Amick Dep. p. 119, Ex. 58 to BMW's Memorandum.)
Rosen wrote President Barker on February 24, 2003 "to
rectify the doubt created through the correspondence
related to the Wind Tunnel," and to "apologize for the
negative impact that it created." (Ex. 52A to Plaintiffs'
Memorandum in Opposition.) Rosen labeled his earlier
letter as the "infamous wind tunnel letter," and promised
that his company would "never stop until it has, at one
point or another, completed the Wind Tunnel component
of this project." Id.
On March 12, 2003, President Barker responded to
Rosen's "infamous wind tunnel letter." Plaintiffs contend
that President Barker's [*24] letter comprises a
repudiation amounting to breach of contract, and the
relevant portion of the letter states:
Everyone understood from the beginning
that this was an extremely complex
project, with a multitude of issues to be
addressed. Likewise, it has always been
understood that final agreement between
the parties would not occur until all these
issues were resolved. Indeed, the
Agreement executed by the parties on
April 4, 2002 states clearly in Section 10
that any party may cancel the Agreement
any time after May 1, 2002 if AMREC
and CR-MERC are unable to agree on any
of the exhibits. The current status is that a
number of exhibits have never been
completed because the parties have not
been able to agree on their contents. While
other exhibits have been executed, the
parties have now reopened discussion on
them,
once
again
making
them
incomplete. Accordingly, the April 4,
2002 Agreement functioned as little more
than a letter of intent, whose deadline for
formal
agreement
has
passed.
Accordingly, the parties have since May 1,
2002, been moving forward on the hope
that the Project could come to fruition, but
understanding all along that much
remained to be done before any
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"partnership"
[*25]
or
understanding is formalized.

other

(Ex. 97 to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition.)
President Barker then countered Rosen's allegation that
Clemson was responsible for obtaining presales.
President Barker contended that from the outset, Rosen
had agreed to take full responsibility for the financing
and building of the wind tunnel; President Barker asked:
"[w]hat is the attraction to Clemson of a donation by you
of the Wind Tunnel . . . if Clemson must be responsible
for its financing?" Id. President Barker then requested
assurances that Rosen still intended to build the wind
tunnel:
In the beginning, you gave the
impression to Clemson that you had the
resources necessary to provide the
foundation for meeting the Wind Tunnel's
development costs. If you now feel you
cannot deliver on the Wind Tunnel, or are
dependent on Clemson for its financing,
then it is past time for saying so. Although
Clemson still wishes to partner with you,
we need to know if it must go it alone on
the Wind Tunnel's development.
Id.
President Barker testified that BMW had no
involvement in the preparation of the letter. There is no
evidence to the contrary. Rosen never wrote a response to
President Barker's letter [*26] of March 12. Plaintiffs
also point to a later letter dated May 13, 2003 to Bill
Thompson from Neil Cameron, Vice President for
Advancement at Clemson. Cameron expressly refers
Thompson to President Barker's letter of March 12,
repeats the statement that all of the exhibits were not
completed, and says "[a]s there is currently no agreement,
nothing will be amended. Clemson is, however, interested
in continuing discussions to determine common interests
between the parties, and whether the Project can go
forward to the satisfaction of both parties." (Ex. 126 to
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition.)
At the same time that Rosen and Clemson were
corresponding about their respective commitments to the
wind tunnel, the Governor was undertaking his review of
the project. On January 9, 2003, Secretary Faith met with
Rosen, Clemson, and BMW to discuss the project.
Secretary Faith confirmed Governor Sanford's initial

concern over the balance of the project. On January 10,
2003, Governor Sanford asked the parties to delay their
announcement plans for sixty (60) days so that Secretary
Faith could make a more thorough review of the project.
On February 19, 2003, Secretary Faith met with
representatives [*27] of Clemson to discuss the project.
At this meeting, Clemson took the position that it did not
have a deal with Rosen. Clemson informed Secretary
Faith about the termination provision of the April 2002
Agreement and explained that all of the Exhibits to the
April 2002 Agreement had not been completed. BMW
was not involved in this meeting and did not have any
input into the development of Clemson's position. On
February 20, 2003, the day after Secretary Faith met with
Clemson representatives, Governor Sanford met with key
officials from Clemson, Rosen, BMW and the City of
Greenville, and thereafter held a press conference in
Greenville, saying, "If you have the Clemson franchise
you couldn't put a Wal-Mart or Motel Six as part of it,
and I think that is very important. The other is the actual
structure of the deal. What are you putting in, and what
am I putting. To date, that hasn't been resolved. . . . It will
be a very healthy tug of war and negotiating process."
(Ex. 105 to BMW's Memorandum.) Governor Sanford
told the Greenville News that "we're not committed to
this developer or this site." (Ex. 104 to BMW's
Memorandum.) On March 3, 2003, Secretary Faith told
Gordon Dill of WYFF [*28] News: "The deal is not done
. . . . If the state is going to commit $ 52 million, what's
the state going to see for that? . . . (The money) has not
been spent yet . . . . It has not been decided where the
grad school of engineering is going to go." (Ex. 106 to
BMW's Memorandum.)
One of the aspects of the project that was questioned
by Secretary Faith was the proposed $ 12 million road
through the Hollingsworth Property (the "Road"). In
August 2002, the State Infrastructure Bank ("SIB"),
which was headed by Champ Covington, approved a
measure to reimburse the City of Greenville for the costs
of the Road. The vote on this measure was contested, and
passed by a 4-3 margin. 4 Among the Board members
voting in favor of the Road was Max Metcalf, a BMW
employee who serves on the SIB Board. The Plaintiffs
contend that Max Metcalf should have recognized a
BMW connection to the Road, and should have abstained
from the vote. Governor Sanford and Secretary Faith first
became concerned about the Road funding issue based
upon conversations Governor Sanford had with Senator
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Greg Ryberg. Senator Ryberg is a member of the SIB
Board who had voted against the proposal and was "very
very upset with the [*29] way that these funds were
being used . . . ." (Sanford Dep. p.37-p.38, Ex. 65 to
BMW's Memorandum.) In his affidavit, Senator Ryberg
testified that he opposed Covington at every turn.
4
On January 15, 2003, Rosen, the City of
Greenville, and Champ Covington signed the
Intergovernmental
Agreement
("IGA")
formalizing the SIB's funding obligation. Rosen's
entity, BCD, LLC, entered into only the "Joinder
of Developer for Limited Purpose" provision,
which set forth Rosen's obligation to establish a
research park in the development. (Exhibit 75 to
BMW's Memorandum.) Section 10.2 of the IGA
makes clear that Rosen had no rights under the
agreement - it was an intergovernmental
agreement entered into "for the sole protection
and benefit of the Bank and the City," providing
that "[n]o other . . . parties shall, under any
circumstances, be deemed to be a beneficiary of
any conditions or obligationsf.]" Id. While
Plaintiffs rely heavily upon the Road in the First
Amended Complaint and their memorandum, the
First Amended Complaint does not allege that the
Road contracts were breached.
After familiarizing himself with the details, Secretary
Faith determined that the deal being negotiated between
Rosen [*30] and Clemson was not fair for the State. He
determined that fundamental changes to the project
would have to be made before State-funded assets would
be committed to the project. If a new deal could not be
reached, Secretary Faith was prepared to locate the GEC
on an alternate site. Secretary Faith informed Rosen of
his position and that Faith was willing to tie the matter up
in litigation if necessary. 5
5 In addition to the issue of whether the State
was obligated to pay for a road through a wholly
private development, there were also issues
regarding the City's progress in completing the
conditions precedent to SIB funding under the
IGA. Through its attorney Jim Holly, the SIB
took the position that the SCDOT had not
approved the road system, the requisite permits
were not in place, and that all of the requisite
easements or dedications had not been obtained.
The affidavits of Jim Holly and Rosen attorney

Larry Estridge present different arguments as to
whether the necessary and sufficient easements or
dedications had been supplied; however, neither
attorney addresses the SCDOT approval or the
permits in their arguments.
Meanwhile, negotiations between Clemson and
Rosen continued. In [*31] his "infamous wind tunnel
letter," Rosen had requested that Clemson "identify a
Clemson point person to be authorized to negotiate a
transaction" with Rosen. (Ex. 43 to Plaintiffs'
Memorandum in Opposition.) President Barker asked
Clemson University Trustee Bill Smith, who is a real
estate developer, to serve as the point person for Clemson
in the negotiations. Barker also asked the other Clemson
representatives to make sure that future conversations
with Rosen take place at the negotiating table. Upon
entering the negotiations, Trustee Smith asked Rosen to
make a firm commitment to build the wind tunnel. Rosen
did not satisfy Trustee Smith, and Trustee Smith became
convinced "that the wind tunnel was an uncertainty, and
that any proposed deal should have sufficient value to
justify it on the real estate terms alone." (Smith Aff. P7,
Ex. 78 to BMW's Memorandum.) Rosen states in his
affidavit that he viewed the Clemson officials as trying to
obtain a "guarantee" on the wind tunnel, and Rosen
testifies he consistently would not give one and was not
required to give one. (Rosen Aff. PP 5, 11, Ex. 40 to
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition.)
On March 24, 2003, Smith emailed Rosen a new
[*32] proposed deal structure with two alternatives
entitled "Option A" and "Option B." (Ex. 80 to BMW's
Memorandum.) Option A proposed that the GEC, which
was not subject to the April 2002 Agreement, would be
located upon the Hollingsworth Property. In return,
Option A proposed that Rosen would lower some of the
prices that AMREC would pay to acquire property for its
campus and Rosen would also provide assurance that he
was building the wind tunnel by agreeing to a S 5 million
escrow, which would be forfeited if Rosen did not
achieve specified benchmarks towards the wind tunnel
construction. Option B also proposed that the GEC would
be located on the Hollingsworth Property, but it assumed
that Rosen was not building the wind tunnel. To make up
this value, Option B required Rosen to donate additional
land to AMREC.
In April 2003, Rosen made a counterproposal to
Clemson. Under his counterproposal, Rosen proposed to
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donate some additional land to Clemson in return for
Clemson and BMW agreeing to locate the GEC on the
Hollingsworth Property. However, Rosen's proposal did
not provide a firm commitment on the wind tunnel.
Instead, Rosen offered to donate five (5) additional acres
if he did not [*33] build the wind tunnel by 2006.
Rosen's proposal pushed the deadline for beginning
design of the wind tunnel to 2004. Rosen's proposal
would also have made BMW a party to an agreement and
placed an obligation on BMW to assist Rosen in
marketing the site.
Rosen's counter-proposal was not acceptable to
Clemson. As a result, Clemson determined that it must
move on and find a different site for the GEC (an option
sometimes informally referred to as "Option C" 6 ). On
April 26, 2003, the Clemson University Board of
Trustees passed a resolution that read:
The Clemson University Board of
Trustees supports the development of the
Clemson
International
Center
for
Automotive Research in a site to be
determined in the greater Greenville area,
and charges the Clemson University
Administration to move forward as
expeditiously as possible.
(Ex. 82 to BMW's Memorandum.)
Consistent with the directive given by the Clemson
Board of Trustees in the April 26 Resolution, the
Clemson administration began to shift its focus towards
acquiring land off Verdae Boulevard that was also owned
by the Hollingsworth interests. The record is clear that by
this time BMW representatives were also in favor of
finding another [*34] site for the GEC, including
advocating for a purchase of the Verdae property. In June
2003, Clemson and the SCDOC began having
discussions and correspondence with the Hollingsworth
organization. The efforts to obtain another site were
known to Rosen; his key representative Bill Thompson
told the Greenville News "[t]he state and Clemson have
been telling us for months . . . they've been looking at
other sites. . . . Nothing ever happens. We're going
ahead." (Thompson Dep. p. 178, Ex. 43 to BMW's
Memorandum.)
6
Przirembel Dep. p. 106, Ex. 1 to BMW's
Memorandum.

In June 2003, negotiations between Clemson and
Rosen were renewed under a different deal structure and
continued at a protracted pace. On August 14, 2003,
Rosen's attorneys prepared an initial draft of the Real
Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement that would
constitute the framework for the new deal that was being
finalized by Clemson and Rosen. On October 6, 2003,
CUREF and Rosen executed the Real Estate Purchase
and Sale Agreement (the "October 2003 Agreement").
The October 2003 Agreement is the "final" agreement
that provided for the sale of land for the new campus, and
addressed all outstanding subject areas. Section 6.13 of
the [*35] October 2003 Agreement provides that the
earlier April 2002 Agreement and its Exhibits were
"terminated for all purposes without any liabilities to any
of the parties[.]" (Ex. 89 to BMW's Memorandum.) The
October 2003 Agreement gave Clemson the right to
acquire 250 acres of the 407 acre parcel without any
development rights or fees for Rosen. The October 2003
Agreement specifically identified each parcel going to
Clemson. Attached to the agreement was the final CCR
agreed upon by the parties covering both Clemson's and
Rosen's portion of the park.
On the day the October 2003 Agreement was
executed, Rosen told the Greenville News "I'm pleased
with the final deal." (Ex. 90 to BMW's Memorandum.)
As an agreed part of the transaction, Rosen took over $
44 million in charitable tax deductions for the land
transactions governed by the October 2003 Agreement.
The land Rosen retained in the final transaction adjoins
the site of the GEC, which together with its surrounding
campus is now known as "CU-ICAR," which stands for
the "Clemson University International Center for
Automotive Research."
II. STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper if the record shows
"that there is no genuine issue as to any material [*36]
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. A genuine issue of
material fact is raised only if a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for Plaintiffs on each element necessary
to their case. Banco Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons,
Inc., 132 F.3d 1017, 1027 (4th Cir. 1997). In ruling upon
a summary judgment motion, the Court is to consider
only evidence that would be admissible at trial. Maryland
Highways Contractors Ass'n v. Maryland, 933 F.2d 1246,
1251-52 (4th Cir. 1991). Affidavits opposing a motion
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for summary judgment are not to be considered to the
extent that they contain hearsay or contain statements that
are not based upon personal knowledge. Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co. v. United States Rubber Co., 279
F. 2d 409, 415-16 (4th Cir. 1960).
Under Rule 56, the Court must construe the facts in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
US. 574, 587-88, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed 2d 538
(1986). However, the non-moving party "cannot create a
genuine issue of material fact through mere speculation
or the building of one inference upon another." Beale v.
Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985). Unsupported
[*37] allegations and conclusions "do not confer
talismanic immunity from Rule 56." Ross v.
Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th
Cir. 1985).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs have asserted three causes of action against
BMW: (1) tortious interference with existing contract; (2)
tortious interference with prospective contract; and (3)
civil conspiracy. The Court finds that summary judgment
in favor of BMW is appropriate on all causes of action.
A. Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine provides BMW with
a complete defense to all causes of action. The First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
guarantees the right to petition the government for
redress. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor
Advertising, 499 U.S. 365, 379, 111 S. Ct. 1344, 113 L.
Ed. 2d 382 (1991). The Noerr-Pennington doctrine
protects this right by immunizing parties from liability
for efforts to seek relief from the government. See
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 140-141, 81 S. Ct. 523, 5 L.
Ed. 2d 464 (1961); A Fisherman's Best, Inc. v. Rec.
Fishing Alliance, 310 F.3d 183, 189-191 (4th Cir. 2002).
The actor's motivation for trying to influence the
government is irrelevant, as Noerr-Pennington protects
[*38] any "concerted effort to influence public officials
regardless of intent or purpose." City of Columbia, 499
U.S. at 379 (internal quotes omitted). The immunity
applies even if the means employed "can be termed
unethical."
Noerr,
365
US.
at
140-141.
Noerr-Pennington immunity also protects requests that
would lead "public officials to take official action that

will harm or eliminate competition." Savage v. Waste
Management, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1505, 1513 (D.S.C
1985) (internal quotes omitted).
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine protects attempts to
influence virtually all types of governmental entities,
including the executive branch of government,
municipalities, and public universities. See id. (applying
the doctrine to executive, legislative, and municipal
actions); Gunderson v. University of Alaska, 922 P.2d
229 (Alaska 1996) (applying the doctrine to a public
university); S.C Code Ann. § 15-78-30 (defining the
"State" as "the State of South Carolina and any of its . . .
schools, colleges, universities, and technical colleges");
S.C. Code Ann. § 8-1-10 (defining Clemson's Trustees as
"public officers" of the State).
While the Noerr-Pennington doctrine was "originally
developed in the [*39] antitrust context, the doctrine has
now universally been applied to business torts," including
tortious interference. 1GEN Int'l, Inc. v. Roche
Diagnostics GMBH, 335 F.3d 303, 310 (4th Cir. 2003).
The doctrine also applies to conspiracy claims. City of
Columbia, 499 U.S. at 383. Application of the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine is a question of law for the
Court to decide. 1GENInt'l, Inc., 335 FJdat 310.
1. Application of Noerr-Pennington
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is applicable to
Plaintiffs' claims against BMW. Plaintiffs have alleged
that BMW conspired with numerous State officials and
Clemson to interfere with Rosen's contractual rights to
the benefit of BMW and Clemson. These allegations are
similar to the claims asserted in A Fisherman's Best.. 310
F.3d at 189-191. As in that case, the allegations against
BMW are incidental to BMW's First Amendment right to
petition and are therefore protected. Plaintiffs rely
extensively upon allegations regarding the actions of
governmental actors such as Governor Mark Sanford,
Secretary of Commerce Bob Faith, and Clemson
President James Barker. Even assuming these allegations
are true, this behavior would constitute protected First
Amendment
[*40] conduct under the above cited
authority. As such, BMW would be entitled to
Noerr-Pennington protection under the most generous
interpretation of Plaintiffs' theory of liability and the
evidence.
Plaintiffs argue on pages 2-3 of their Memorandum
in Opposition that summary judgment is not appropriate
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on the Noerr-Pennington doctrine because AMREC is a
"private entity" and "[a] jury issue concerning BMW's
interference is presented by the overwhelming evidence
of what were at times multiple daily contacts between
BMW and AMREC." Plaintiffs misstate the legal
standard. The application of Noerr-Pennington is a
question of law for the Court to decide. The relevant test
for determining whether the existence of a private entity
in a transaction destroys Noerr-Pennington immunity is
whether the private activity is "independent of any
government action" and is not "'incidental' to a valid
effort to influence governmental action." Allied Tube &
Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 499,
108 S. Ct. 1931, 100 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1988). Given
Plaintiffs' extensive reliance upon the activities of
governmental actors and the undisputed fact that BMW's
involvement in the transaction stemmed from its
agreement to sponsor the State-funded [*41] GEC,
Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the interactions
between BMW and AMREC (or any other private actor)
were independent of and not incidental to any
governmental action. As such, BMW is entitled to
Noerr-Pennington immunity, and summary judgment is
appropriate on all causes of action on that ground alone.
2. Sham Exception
To avoid the application of the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine, Plaintiffs ask the Court to find the existence of
an exception to the doctrine in this case. Plaintiffs argue
that Noerr-Pennington does not apply to conduct that is
"overtly
corrupt."
(Plaintiffs'
Memorandum
in
Opposition, p. 11.) While not acknowledged in Plaintiffs'
memorandum, the sham exception is the only recognized
exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See A
Fisherman's Best, Inc., 310 F.3d at 189-191; Litton
Systems, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785
(2nd Cir. 1983). The Court finds that BMW did not
engage in a sham petition of the government.
The sham exception applies where a party does not
have a genuine interest in influencing governmental
action, but instead utilizes the governmental process,
without a realistic hope of success, for the purpose of
harassing a competitor. See [*42] A Fisherman's Best,
Inc., 310 F.3d at 191. For example, the filing of a
frivolous lawsuit to delay a competitor from bringing a
product to market would constitute a sham. Id. Activity is
a sham only if the actor is interested in the process and
not the outcome. The sham exception does not apply if

the actor actually hopes to achieve some affirmative
result from the governmental entity. As the Fourth Circuit
has noted, a "successful effort to influence governmental
action certainly cannot be characterized as a sham." Id.
(internal quotes omitted). Plaintiffs cannot meet this
standard, as their claims are predicated upon the assertion
that BMW successfully influenced governmental actors
to take actions harmful to Plaintiffs.
For instance, Plaintiffs allege that BMW influenced
the State to force Rosen to surrender his rights to a large
portion of the Hollingsworth Property so that BMW
could locate the GEC and other research functions on the
site. The fruition of the GEC and the "success" of BMW's
alleged plan to separate Rosen from the property he
controlled belies any argument that BMW's activities
were a sham.
Moreover, Plaintiffs' attempt to avoid the preclusive
effects of the October [*43] 2003 Agreement, which
expressly terminates "for all purposes" the contract
underlying Plaintiffs' claims, by contending that Rosen
entered the October 2003 Agreement under duress. (Ex.
89 to BMW's Memorandum.) This argument necessarily
relies upon the assertion that BMW was successful in
petitioning the State to apply pressure to Rosen.
Plaintiffs' repeated reliance upon BMW's alleged
successful petitioning of governmental actors cannot be
reconciled with an argument that BMW's efforts were in
any sense a sham.
While not directly arguing that BMW's conduct was
a sham, Plaintiffs rely upon sham exception cases to
assert that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine does not apply
to conduct that is "overtly corrupt." (Plaintiffs'
Memorandum in Opposition, p. 11.) To support this
assertion, Plaintiffs rely upon California Motor Transport
Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 US. 508, 92 S Ct. 609,
30 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1972), and its progeny. California
Motor Transport is readily distinguishable from the facts
of this case. First, California Motor Transport is a sham
exception case. City of Columbia, 499 U.S. at 381-82.
For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs have not
established that BMW's activities were a sham.
Second, the holding [*44] in California Motor
Transport is limited to attempts to deny a party's access
to the courts or other adjudicatory tribunals. 404 US. at
511-12 (noting that the "allegations are not that the
conspirators sought 'to influence public officials,' but that
they sought to bar their competitors from meaningful
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access to adjudicatory tribunals and so to usurp that
decisionmaking process"). The discussion of corrupt
conduct in California Motor Transport was limited to
whether behavior such as perjury and bribery had the
effect of barring one's access to the Courts. As the Court
noted, "[misrepresentations, condoned in the political
arena, are not immunized when used in the adjudicatory
process." Id. at 513. There is no allegation in this case
that BMW filed a lawsuit or administrative proceeding
against Rosen or that BMW denied Rosen access to any
court or similar tribunal. This fact alone renders
California Motor Transport and its progeny inapplicable
to this case.
All of the allegations regarding BMW's attempts to
petition governmental actors involve classic political
activity. The City of Columbia Court reaffinned the broad
application of Noerr-Pennington in these situations:
Few governmental [*45] actions are
immune from the charge that they are "not
in the public interest" or in some sense
"corrupt.". . . Any lobbyist or applicant, in
addition to getting himself heard, seeks by
procedural and other means to get his
opponent ignored.
499 U.S. at 377-82. This language directly refutes the
notion that there is a general "corruption" exception to
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Allegations of corruption
are only relevant to the determination of whether the
petitioner's activities were a sham, and even then only to
the extent that such conduct has barred one's access to the
courts or other similar governmental tribunals.
Even assuming that such a broad "corruption"
exception does exist, Plaintiffs have not put forth any
evidence that BMW in fact engaged in any illegal or
corrupt conduct. The closest Plaintiffs come are the
following allegations: (1) that Governor Mark Sanford
"threatened" Greenville Mayor Knox White that he might
move the project out of Greenville (Plaintiffs'
Memorandum in Opposition, p. 4); (2) that Secretary of
Commerce Bob Faith "threatened" Greenville City
Councilman Gary Coulter with political payback if he did
not go along with the Governor's wishes (Plaintiffs' [*46]
Memorandum in Opposition, p. 3, 26); 7 and (3) that
BMW employee and SIB board member Max Metcalf
had a conflict of interest when he voted to approve the
Road. The allegations regarding Governor Sanford and

Secretary Faith, which are addressed in detail below, are
irrelevant for Noerr-Pennington
purposes, as the
Noerr-Pennington analysis focuses on the actions of the
petitioner rather than on the actions of the governmental
actors being petitioned. Federal Prescription Service,
Inc. v. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 214 U.S. App.
D.C 76, 663 F.2d 253, 266 (D.C Cir. 1981); see also
A.D. Bedell Wholesale Company, Inc. v. Philip Morris
Inc., 263 F.3d 239, 255 n.34 (3d Cir. 20tf/j(internal
quotes omitted)(noting that the right to petition would be
"considerably chilled" if the petitioner was required to
predict whether the governmental actor would engage in
unconstitutional activities). There is no evidence BMW
threatened anyone or otherwise engaged in a corrupt
manner.
7 Plaintiffs also discuss a phone call between
BMW employee Bobby Hitt and Councilman
Coulter, but there is no indication of any threat or
"corrupt conduct" by Hitt on this call.
Moreover, Plaintiffs have not cited any legal
authority for the assertion [*47] that Metcalf s service on
the SIB board automatically vitiates Noerr-Pennington
immunity. More importantly, their allegations of a
conflict of interest are irrelevant ~ as the undisputed
evidence is that Metcalf acted entirely consistent with
Rosen's objectives by voting for the Road. It is
undisputed that the Road was important to Rosen and that
Metcalf voted for the Road; indeed, Plaintiffs label
Metcalf the "deciding vote." (Plaintiffs' Memorandum in
Opposition, p.41.) Given the importance of the Road to
Plaintiffs, they cannot claim any actionable harm
resulting from Metcalf s vote to fund the Road. Similarly,
Plaintiffs argue on page 9 of their Memorandum in
Opposition that !,[t]he inference may be drawn that Max
Metcalf played a role in halting the road funds." Plaintiffs
have not submitted sufficient evidence to support such an
inference, and it is contrary to the undisputed evidence
regarding Metcalfs role. Even if Plaintiffs had
demonstrated such a connection to Metcalf, Plaintiffs
have not met their burden of establishing that Metcalfs
role on the SIB rendered BMW's entire involvement in
the transaction a sham. BMW is entitled to
Noerr-Pennington immunity as to all causes [*48] of
action asserted by Plaintiffs.
B. Tortious Interference with Contract
The elements of a cause of action for tortious
interference with contract under South Carolina law are:
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(1) the existence of the contract; (2) the other parly's
knowledge of the contract; (3) the other parly's
intentional procurement of the breach of the contract; (4)
the absence of justification; and (5) resulting damage.
Webb v. EIrod, 308 S.C. 445, 418 S.E.2d 559, 561 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1992).
1. Existence of a Contract
A cause of action for tortious interference
"presupposes the existence of a valid, enforceable
contract." Jackson v. Bi-Lo Stores, Inc., 313 S.C. 272,
437 S.E.2d 168, 171 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993). The Court
finds that Plaintiffs have not created a genuine issue of
material fact on the essential element of the existence of a
contract.
a. The October 2003 Agreement
Plaintiffs base their tortious interference claim upon
the April 2002 Agreement, along with certain Exhibits
thereto. 8 It is undisputed that the April 2002 Agreement,
which is the agreement Plaintiffs allege to have been
breached, was expressly terminated in the October 2003
Agreement signed by Rosen. The Fourth Circuit has held
that under the doctrine of quasi-estoppel, a [*49] party
cannot accept or retain the benefits of a transaction {e.g.
the October 2003 Agreement) and take a position
inconsistent therewith. In re Robb, 23 F.3d 895, 898-899
(4th Cir. 1994). The Fourth Circuit has recognized that
quasi-estoppel applies where a party enters a second
contract and then later attempts to assert rights under a
prior agreement. National Manufacture & Stores Corp. v.
Whitman, 93 F.2d 829, 831-832 (4th Cir. 1938) (applying
South Carolina law and noting that if a party "had any
such rights [under the first contract], and desired to
maintain them, he should have abstained from putting
himself in a position where he voluntarily took advantage
of the second opportunity to secure the work"). Given
Rosen's decision to accept the benefits of the October
2003 Agreement, he is now estopped from asserting
claims predicated upon a breach of the earlier, terminated
April 2002 Agreement. 9 Id.; see also Modern Enter.,
Inc. v. Allen, 802 F.2d 312, 313 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding
that a voluntary cancellation by the plaintiff cannot
support the breach element of a tortious interference
claim).
8 The First Amended Complaint identifies the
following Exhibits to the April 2002 Agreement
[*50] as having been breached: (1) the AMREC

Campus Development Agreement; (2) the Wind
Tunnel Development Agreement; (3) the AMREC
Campus Management Agreement; and (4) the
Wind Tunnel Management Agreement. (1st Am.
Compl. PP 170-173) Notably, the license
agreements and the Operating Agreement of WT,
LLC are not identified as having been breached.
The First Amended Complaint does reference the
Hoi lings worth Contract in the first cause of
action. However, that agreement was between
BCD and several Hollingsworth entities. There is
no allegation in the record that either BCD or the
Hollingsworth
entities
breached
the
Hollingsworth Contract.
9 Plaintiffs rely upon Moore v. Weinberg, 373
S.C. 209\ 644 S.E.2d 740 (S.C. Ct.App. 2007), to
argue that BMW cannot rely upon Rosen's
voluntary termination of the April 2002
Agreement. However, Weinberg is a novation
case, and does not counter the estoppel issues
raised by Rosen's conduct. Moreover, even if the
issue of novation is relevant, Plaintiffs reliance on
Weinberg is misplaced. That case did not involve
a claim for tortious interference. Breach of
contract is an essential element of a tortious
interference claim. Therefore, BMW is entitled to
rely on any contractual [*51] defenses that would
be available in a breach of contract action in
defending the tortious interference claim.
b. Duress
To avoid the preclusive effect of the October 2003
Agreement, Plaintiffs rest upon the idea that Rosen
entered this agreement under coercion or duress.
However, Rosen testified that the execution of the
October 2003 Agreement was voluntary. Moreover,
Plaintiffs are estopped from claiming duress. Rosen's
entities have taken over $ 44 million in charitable tax
deductions resulting from the October 2003 Agreement.
A key element of any charitable deduction is that it must
be voluntary. See 26 U.S.C § 170; United States v.
American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 106 S. Ct.
2426, 91 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1987). Having represented in their
tax filings that the October 2003 Agreement was a
voluntary transaction, Plaintiffs and Rosen are now
estopped from arguing to the contrary. Summary
judgment is appropriate on this ground alone. See In re
Breibert, 325 B.R. 724, 727 (Bankr. D.S.C 2004)
(holding that "the Court need not inquire further and finds
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that Debtor is estopped from asserting a position other
than that consistently taken on his tax returns").
Aside from the estoppel issues and Rosen's own
testimony, Plaintiffs [*52] have not created a genuine
issue of fact regarding the duress claim. The elements for
a claim of duress are:
(1) the coerced party must show that he
has been the victim of a wrongful or
unlawful act or threat, (2) such act or
threat must be one which deprives the
victim of his unfettered will, (3) as a direct
result the coerced party must be compelled
to make a disproportionate exchange of
values or give up something for nothing,
(4) the payment or exchange must be
made solely for the purposes of protecting
the coerced party's business or property
interests, and (5) the coerced party must
have no adequate legal remedy.
Johnson v. Columbia, 949 F.2d 127, 131-132 (4th Cir.
2005).
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Rosen was
forced to enter into a contract against his will. In
evaluating a duress claim, one must consider the
"capacity of the party influenced." Holler v. Holler, 364
S.C. 256, 612 S.E.2d 469, 475 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005).
Rosen is a sophisticated businessman with a current net
worth between $ 70 and $ 75 million. At all times during
this case, Rosen was represented by legal teams from at
least three law firms. Rosen also has his own in-house
legal counsel. The result of the supposed duress, [*53]
the October 2003 Agreement, was the product of what
Rosen's attorney described as "extensive" negotiations.
(Estridge Dep. p. 110-111, Ex. 88 to BMW's
Memorandum.) During the relevant time period, Rosen
never sought financing for the project. Rosen executive
Bill Thompson told the Greenville News on March 1,
2003 that "[n]o one has required us to provide the
financing yet. We're just getting started. It's not to that
stage yet." (Thompson Dep. p. 151-152, Ex. 43 to BMW's
Memorandum.) Additionally, during the period of his
supposed duress, Rosen made proposals to Hollingsworth
to obtain an interest in even more property in the area.
When the October 2003 Agreement was signed, Rosen
told the Greenville News that he was "pleased with the
final deal." (Ex. 90 to BMW's Memorandum.) Given

these facts, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated evidence that
Rosen's will was not his own when he executed the
October 2003 Agreement.
Even if Plaintiffs had met their burden on this point,
Plaintiffs have provided no guidance as to how the Court
would provide Plaintiffs with a remedy. Coercion is a
defense to the enforcement of an otherwise valid contract.
Id. at 475. The appropriate remedy for a successful [*54]
claim of duress is to rescind the contract. Id. Plaintiffs
have not addressed whether rescission is feasible in this
matter and what the consequences of rescinding the
October 2003 Agreement would be upon the subsequent
contractual agreements Rosen and Clemson have entered
with third parties.
2. Breach
Breach of contract is an "essential element" of a
tortious interference claim. Eldeco, Inc. v. Charleston
County Sch. Dist., 372 S.C. 470, 642 S.E.2d 726, 732
(S.C. 2007). Therefore, to succeed on a claim of tortious
interference, Plaintiffs must show that AMREC breached
a contract at the inducement of BMW. Id. at 561. It is
insufficient for Plaintiffs to raise disputed facts that
amount to a mere hindrance to performance of a contract.
Egrets Pointe Townhouses Prop. Owners Assoc, Inc. v.
Fairfield Communities, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 110, 116
(D.S.C. 1994).
a. Repudiation
Plaintiffs argue on page 50 of their Memorandum in
Opposition that a "breach occurred when AMREC
refused to proceed under the April/May 2002 contracts,
as written, and repeatedly denied there were contracts at
all." More specifically, Plaintiffs claim that the April
2002 Agreement was repudiated by President Barker of
Clemson in his March [*55] 12, 2003 letter to Cliff
Rosen. 10 For a repudiation to occur:
(1) the repudiation must be
unequivocalf;] (2) the repudiation must be
a "final and absolute declaration that the
contract must be regarded as altogether
off[;]" (3) the repudiation must be
unconditional!;] (4) the repudiation cannot
rest on a "partial breach" but must "go to
the whole consideration of the contract,"
relate to the "very essence of the contract,"
and "defeat the object of the parties in
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making the contract[;]" (5) while the
repudiation need not be express, if it rests
on the defendant's conduct it must evince
"a clear intention to refuse performance in
the future[.]"
Collins Holding Corp. v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co.,
204 F. App'x 208, 211-212 (4th Cir. 2006) (applying
South Carolina law).
10 Plaintiffs also rely upon a similar letter from
Neill Cameron of Clemson to Rosen employee
Bill Thompson dated May 13, 2003. However,
this letter adds little to the discussion, as Cameron
relies upon and repeats the positions taken by
President Barker. Plaintiffs focus on of one of the
concluding sentences of Cameron's letter stating
"[a]s there is currently no agreement, nothing will
be amended." (Ex. 12(3 to Plaintiffs' [*56]
Memorandum in Opposition.) However, it is clear
from the preceding sentences that Cameron is
referring to the failure to agree to all the Exhibits.
It is also noteworthy that this letter was sent at a
time that the parties had exchanged proposals for
a new agreement, and these negotiations
ultimately led to the execution of the October
2003 Agreement.
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Clemson
repudiated the April 2002 Agreement. President Barker's
assessment of the status of the relationship between the
parties was accurate, and Plaintiffs have not created a
genuine issue of material fact in this regard. President
Barker did not deny the existence of any agreement.
President Barker asserted that the April 2002 Agreement
gave either party the right to cancel the agreement
because all of the Exhibits to the April 2002 Agreement
had not been completed on or before May 1, 2002.
The record reveals that agreement on all of the
required Exhibits had not been reached by May 1, 2002,
and the April 2002 Agreement was never amended to
remove the requirement that the parties agree to the
Exhibits identified therein. l l Most importantly, the
parties had not yet agreed on how the Hollingsworth
[*57] Property was to be divided. Exhibit G was to record
the parties' agreement on what parcels of land would go
to AMREC and what parcels would remain with Rosen.
Plaintiffs concede that this issue had not been resolved by
May 1, 2002, and that Rosen did not make his first

proposed property delineation until December 2002. It is
also undisputed that Clemson objected to Rosen's initial
proposal. 12 The land delineations were not finally
resolved until the October 2003 Agreement, which
expressly terminated the April 2002 Agreement.
Plaintiffs claim on page 52 of their Memorandum in
Opposition that the lack of agreement was "not an issue"
because AMREC's attorneys included a sketch of the
whole campus (without any delineations of any parcels)
in a binder of the agreements that had been executed by
May 1, 2002. However, this artistic rendering, which was
prepared well before the April 2002 Agreement was even
executed, does not reflect any agreement by the parties on
the land issue.
11
It is [*58] undisputed that the parties
negotiated such an amendment to the April 2002
Agreement, yet never executed the document.
Instead, they executed the October 2003
Agreement, which terminated the April 2002
Agreement.
12 Rosen has submitted an affidavit, filed on
January 14, 2008, that artfully asserts that all
parties were "aware" of the proposed parcel
delineations by January 2003. (Rosen Aff. P 15)
However, he never alleges that Clemson agreed to
the proposed delineations. In any event; there was
not a signed writing reflecting an agreement.
Plaintiffs' reliance upon Paragraph 20 of the April
2002 Agreement, which states that an Exhibit controls to
the extent that it is inconsistent with the master
agreement, is misplaced. 13 The Exhibits were to
manifest the parties' agreement on matters dealt with only
in general terms by the master agreement. Plaintiffs'
argument ignores the fact that the parties never agreed to
the land delineations. The artistic rendering contains no
relevant information, and is only "inconsistent" with the
April 2002 Agreement to the extent it does not satisfy the
requirements for creating Exhibit G. l 4
13 As an example of the potential application of
this provision, [*59] the April 2002 Agreement
states that Rosen would be the exclusive
developer for the AMREC campus, yet the agreed
to AMREC Campus Development Agreement
provides that any State-funded project is an
exception to Rosen's agreement and would not be
subject to any development rights. The more
specific treatment in the agreed-upon Exhibit
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controls over the general statement in the master
agreement.
14 Even if the Court were to adopt Plaintiffs'
reasoning, there still would be no breach as the
contract would fail. If this real estate agreement
was "final" on May 1, 2002 with the land issue
still unresolved, then the agreement would fail to
include an essential term. See Player v. Chandler,
299 S.C 101, 382S.E.2d891 (S.C. /9S?)(finding
that the essential terms of a lease include "definite
agreement as to the extent and boundary of the
property to be leased").
The parties also had not agreed to Exhibits F and H
by May 1, 2002. As noted above, the parties proposed
before May 1, 2002 to combine these two exhibits into
one document referred to as the CCR. They
acknowledged that this change would need to be reflected
in an amendment to the April 2002 Agreement. While the
parties negotiated this proposed amendment [*60]
throughout 2002, it was never executed. l 5 Thus, the
April 2002 Agreement at all times required agreement on
these Exhibits prior to May 1, 2002. Such an agreement
was not reached until the CCR was finalized as part of
the October 2003 Agreement. Plaintiffs seek to excuse
the lack of agreement on F and H by referring to the two
placeholders inserted by John Campbell in the binder he
prepared that contained the words "NOT USED."
(Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition, p. 51.) However,
these placeholders are only relevant if they are an
amendment to the April 2002 Agreement. The pieces of
paper are not signed writings, which would be required to
modify the April 2002 Agreement, and it is undisputed
that the agreement was never modified. Plaintiffs argue
that a question of fact exists because Rosen and his
attorneys testified that they thought a "final, binding
contract" was entered on May 1, 2002. (Memorandum in
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, p. 4.) However, this type of conclusory
statement does nothing to change the fact that these
Exhibits were not done by May 1, 2002, and the parties
never amended the requirement that they be completed.
15 While the change [*61] to the CCR was not
incorporated into an amended master agreement,
the CCR did find its way into the Exhibits. The
License Agreement expressly required that the
CCR be completed. It is undisputed that the CCR
was not finalized until the October 2003
Agreement. This further confirms that President

Barker was correct that all of the necessary
agreements had not been completed.
Even if President Barker was incorrect when he
wrote that the April 2002 Agreement was subject to
cancellation, Plaintiffs still are not entitled to treat his
letter as a breach. First, the April 2002 Agreement
required that Rosen provide AMREC with notice of any
default under any of their agreements, including the April
2002 Agreement. It is undisputed that Plaintiffs never
provided any such notice. Therefore, Rosen did not
perform all conditions precedent to treating the letter as a
breach. Setting aside the contractual requirements, if
Rosen reasonably doubted AMREC's willingness to
perfomi, he was not entitled to treat the letter as a breach
unless he first sought adequate assurances that AMREC
would perform in the future. Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 251 (1981). It is undisputed that Rosen never
wrote [*62] back to President Barker, never sought
adequate assurances, and never sought to correct any
errors supposedly made by President Barker. 16 Instead,
Rosen opted to negotiate a new agreement with Clemson
that terminated the April 2002 Agreement "for all
purposes." (Ex. 89 to BMW's Memorandum.) Having
done so, Plaintiffs cannot now characterize President
Barker's letter as a repudiation.
16
Rosen also did not respond to Cameron's
letter.
b. Other Alleged Breach
Plaintiffs also allege on page 15 of their Partial
Summary Judgment Memorandum that AMREC
breached its contractual obligations by failing to make
Clemson employee Don Rice available for up to 80% of
his time "promoting and securing pre-sales or letters of
intent." As an initial matter, the provision Plaintiffs refer
to is found in the Operating Agreement of WT, LLC.
Plaintiffs did not identify this agreement in its First
Amended Complaint as having been breached. This
agreement is the operating agreement of WT, LLC, a
South Carolina entity that would destroy subject matter
jurisdiction as a necessary party. Moreover, the provision
Plaintiffs are relying upon never mentions "presales" or
"letters of intent." 17 Plaintiffs' interpretation [*63] of
this provision is not reasonable and cannot serve as the
basis for a breach claim. Plaintiffs also allege that
AMREC breached an obligation to "mutually develop" a
marketing plan. (Plaintiffs' Partial Summary Judgment
Memorandum, p. 10.) There is not any factual basis to
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allege that AMREC rejected an overture to complete a
marketing plan. The record reveals the opposite, as it was
President Barker, in his March 12 letter, faulting Rosen
for his lack of focus on the marketing plan.
17
The relevant provision actually refers to
making Don Rice available for "up to 80%" of
Don Rice's time for "promotion and operations"
of the wind tunnel. (Ex. 74 to Plaintiffs'
Memorandum in Opposition.) Plaintiffs allege
Rice was failing to satisfy this obligation and had
cut off contact with Rosen in early March 2003.
However, Plaintiffs contradict their own argument
by submitting evidence that Rice was attempting
to secure commitments for the wind tunnel
throughout 2003 and referring in their First
Amended Complaint to communications with
Don Rice after the time when Rice allegedly quit
speaking to Rosen.
Finally, Plaintiffs appear to argue that it v/as
somehow inappropriate for BMW and Clemson to
investigate [*64] alternate sites for the GEC when
negotiations with Rosen broke down in early 2003.
Plaintiffs claim on page 66 of their Memorandum in
Opposition that under the License Agreement Clemson
"could not allow its marks to be used on any
public/private motorsports park . . . ." Contrary to
Plaintiffs' assertion, the License Agreement does not in
any way limit Clemson University's use of its own marks.
The provision in question does limit Clemson's ability to
license its marks to a third party for an automotive
research park. However, the GEC is a Clemson
University school, not a private facility. Plaintiffs have
not alleged that Clemson ever entered such a third party
license. Therefore, Plaintiffs have not created a genuine
issue of material fact in this regard.
3. Inducement of a Breach
Not only must Plaintiffs demonstrate that a breach
occurred, they must also show that the breach was
proximately caused by the wrongful acts of BMW. Smith
v. Citizens and Southern National Bank ofS.C, 241 S.C
285, 128 S.E.2d 112, 114 (S.C. 1962). Stated another
way, Plaintiffs "must show that, but for the interference,
the contractual relationship would have continued." Jones
Eng'g Sales, Inc. v. Faulkner/Baker & Assocs., 1999 US.
App. LEXIS 26920 (4th Cir. Oct. 26, 1999){c\te\ions
[*65] and quotation omitted). Plaintiffs have not met their
burden in this regard.

Plaintiffs rely upon the letters written by President
Barker and Neill Cameron to establish a breach. l 8 Even
assuming that these letters constitute a breach, Plaintiffs
must further demonstrate that the letters were sent at the
inducement of BMW. However, there is no evidence that
the letters were written or sent at the behest of BMW.
The Clemson witnesses testified uniformly that BMW
was not involved in this process and that the letters were
sent because of Clemson's concerns over Rosen's
perceived lack of commitment to building a wind tunnel.
Plaintiffs have not introduced evidence to rebut this
testimony, but instead ask the Court to infer that Clemson
was acting at BMW's behest based upon the regular
communications during the time period that the letters
were sent between BMW, Clemson, and AMREC and the
fact that BMW was making available millions of dollars
for the development of the GEC through its incentive
package. Such an inference is without sufficient
evidentiary basis. President Barker's letter purports to
respond to Cliff Rosen's letter of January 21, 2003
detailing Rosen's difficulties in financing [*66] the wind
tunnel and claiming that Clemson was obligated to
deliver presales for the wind tunnel. President Barker's
letter responds to these allegations and requests
assurances that the wind tunnel will be built. Plaintiffs
have not created a genuine issue of material fact that
BMW was the proximate cause of the position Clemson
reached in President Barker's letter.
18
Plaintiffs' assertions relating to the 80%
provision discussed above are inextricably tied to
the wind tunnel dispute discussed in the letters
exchanged between Rosen and President Barker.
Plaintiffs' proof as to BMW's role in urging
AMREC not to promote the wind tunnel is no
stronger than its proof that BMW induced
President Barker to write his letter.
4. Justification
Absence of justification is an essential element of a
tortious interference claim. Waldrep Bros. Beauty Supply,
Inc. v. Wynn Beauty Supply Co., 992 F.2d 59, 62 (4th Cir.
1993). The absence of justification means conduct that is
carried out for an improper purpose, such as malice or
spite, or through improper means, such as violence or
intimidation. Id. at 63. [*67] Plaintiffs have not
demonstrated that BMW acted for an improper purpose
or employed improper means.
a. Improper Purpose
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If some legitimate purpose or right exists, liability
cannot be imposed even if the defendant exercises that
right for a malicious reason. Id. Moreover, if a defendant
acts for more than one purpose, the improper purpose
must predominate in order to create liability. Crandall
Corp. v. Navistar Int'l Tramp. Corp, 302 S.C 265, 395
S.E.2dl79, 180 (S.C 1990).
It is undisputed that BMW was motivated at least in
part by a desire to find a location for the State-funded
GEC pursuant to its role under the Bond Act. The Bond
Act required that any infrastructure project {e.g. the GEC)
must relate specifically to the economic development
project {e.g. BMW's $ 400 million investment and
willingness to create 400 jobs in South Carolina) for
which it is being contemplated. This means that the GEC
had to support BMW's plans for the State funding to be
available. Moreover, BMW was contemplating a $ 10
million gift to Clemson to endow a chair at the GEC.
BMW was entitled to express its requirements before
making the gift. For these reasons, BMW had a legal
right to be involved in the development [*68] of the
GEC. This right constitutes a legitimate purpose.
Plaintiffs further allege that BMW was interested in
securing portions of the Hollingsworth Property to bring
in suppliers and to locate research facilities on a site
"virtually adjacent" to BMW's Spartanburg plant. (1st
Am. Compl. P 94; Plaintiffs' Memorandum in
Opposition, p. 9.) These would also constitute legitimate
business purposes. Indeed, Plaintiffs allegations cast
BMW as a business competitor. Rosen's April 2003
proposal to Clemson makes clear that Rosen anticipated
securing BMW suppliers as tenants for the site, which
would put Plaintiffs in competition with BMW in that
regard. This type of competitive activity would clearly be
justified. See Waldrep Bros., 992 F.2d at 63.
Plaintiffs summarily assert that BMW had an
improper motive, yet never identify the improper motive
or support this allegation. In any event, Plaintiffs do not
argue that this undefined improper purpose predominated
over the multiple legitimate purposes discussed above
that have been acknowledged and alleged by Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs seek to circumvent this issue by arguing that
whenever an alleged interferor is not enforcing a contract
to which they [*69] are a party, then justification is a
question of fact for the jury to decide. This is not an
accurate statement of South Carolina law. Justification
exists whenever a party is enforcing a "legal right." Id. at

561. The justification element applies to any legal right,
including statutory rights. Gailliard v. Fleet Mortgage
Corp., 880 F. Supp. 1085, 1089-90 (D.S.C 1995).
Summary judgment is appropriate when a party is
pursuing non-contractual rights. See id. (granting
summary judgment where defendant lender had not yet
entered a contract to loan money to the object of the
alleged interference); see also Waldrep Bros., 992 F.2d at
64 (holding that judgment for defendant was appropriate
in tortious interference action where defendant did not
have a contract under which it was enforcing rights).
b. Improper Means
Improper means are defined as "means that are
illegal or independently tortious." Love v. Gamble, 316
S.C. 203, 448 S.E.2d 876, 883 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994)
(internal quotes omitted). In South Carolina, "improper
methods may include violence, threats or intimidation,
bribery, unfounded litigation, fraud, misrepresentation or
deceit, defamation, duress, undue influence, misuse of
inside or confidential [*70] information, or breach of a
fiduciary relationship." Waldrep Bros., 992 F.2d at 63. In
their legal argument, Plaintiffs do not identify a single
example of the use of improper means by BMW. Instead,
they summarily conclude that M[t]he record in this case is
replete with evidence that BMW's conduct was for an
improper purpose and that improper means were
employed." (Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition, p.
63.) This statement is insufficient to meet Plaintiffs'
burden.
Notably, Plaintiffs have not submitted any evidence
of conduct by BMW that falls within the range of
improper conduct described above. Instead, it appears
Plaintiffs seek to attribute to BMW the actions of third
parties, many of them governmental actors under the
No err-Pennington doctrine, to meet the improper means
requirement. For instance, Plaintiffs allege on page 45 of
their Memorandum in Opposition that "BMW also used
governmental officials to attempt to improperly coerce
other governmental officials." Included in the "improper"
conduct by third parties are supposed threats made by
Governor Mark Sanford and Secretary of Commerce Bob
Faith towards officials with the City of Greenville. Even
viewing the facts in the [*71] light most favorable to
Plaintiffs, these statements are not actionable.
For a statement to be an actionable threat, it must
involve some threat of harm. See Brooker v. Silverthorne,
HI S.C 553, 99 S.E. 350 (S.C 1919). Plaintiffs have
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submitted no evidence that Governor Sanford threatened
Mayor White with harm, and it is clear that the "alarm"
Mayor White testified to feeling related to the negative
economic impact the loss of the project would have on
Greenville. (White Dep. 21-24, Ex. 1 to Plaintiffs'
Memorandum in Opposition.) Similarly, Plaintiffs allege
that Secretary Faith threatened Greenville City
Councilman Gary Coulter by asking him to stop an article
from appearing in the newspaper. While Coulter initially
described the incident as a threat, he later described die
incident as "politics as usual[,]" and admitted that he was
not threatened with harm. (Coulter Dep. p. 46-47, Ex. 2
to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition.) It is also
worth noting that Coulter refused to comply with
Secretary Faith's request, and the article ran as scheduled,
meaning that no actionable harm to Rosen could have
resulted from this episode. Finally, even if the "threats"
by Governor Sanford and Secretary Faith [*72] were
actionable, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate how the
statements are attributable to BMW and fail to
acknowledge the obvious Noerr-Pennington issues raised
by Plaintiffs' reliance on the actions of these
governmental officials.
Plaintiffs further allege that BMW carried out a
public relations campaign against Cliff Rosen, and that
the negative publicity generated by this alleged PR
campaign prevented Plaintiffs from moving forward with
the project. Plaintiffs do not cite any supposedly negative
statements by BMW, but instead rely upon statements by
third parties like Secretary Faith. Yet even as to these
third parties, Plaintiffs never specifically identify the
supposedly improper press statements or explain why
they are actionable. BMW has exhibited the articles
regarding the project that ran during the relevant period
of 2003, and these articles do not reasonably support an
inference that BMW was orchestrating a PR plan directed
against Rosen. To the contrary, BMW has cited
deposition testimony of Tom Wells, a Rosen executive,
who testified to his belief that the "negative" press
included accurate statements regarding the status of the
project. (Wells Dep. p. 144-149, Ex. [*73] 73 to BMW's
Memorandum.) For instance, Wells took issue with
statements Secretary Faith made on or about March 3,
2003, including: "it has not been decided where the grad
school of engineering is going to go." Id. It is undisputed
that this statement was accurate, as Rosen has admitted
under oath that there was no contractual obligation to
place the GEC on his property. Yet Wells characterized
Secretary Faith's accurate statements as "negative"

because "they didn't make a commitment putting the
school on the Clemson campus at that time." Id. Plaintiffs
cannot establish improper means through such
allegations, and BMW is entitled to summary judgment
on the justification element.
C. Prospective Interference with Contract
Plaintiffs second cause of action alleges that if the
contracts alleged to have been interfered with in the first
cause of action were not valid and enforceable contracts,
then these contracts represented expectancies that were
interfered with by BMW. Plaintiffs cannot proceed on
their prospective interference claim because Plaintiffs
realized any expectancy they may have had with Clemson
in the October 2003 Agreement. l 9
19 As was the case in the first cause of action,
[*74] Plaintiffs list the Hollingsworth Contract as
one of the potential expectancies interfered with.
However, there is no allegation in the record that
the Hollingsworth Contract was not a valid and
enforceable contract.
The tort of interference with prospective contractual
relations contains the following elements: (1) the
defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs
potential contractual relations; (2) for an improper
purpose or by improper methods; (3) causing injury to
plaintiff. Crandall Corp., 395 S.EJd at 180. A claim for
prospective interference cannot stand if the plaintiff is
able to consummate a contract with the third party. Egrets
Pointe, 870 F. Supp. at 116; see also Gailliard, 880 F.
Supp. at 1091. It is irrelevant if a plaintiff could have
realized a better deal but for the actions of the defendant,
because the term "potential" contractual relations does
not mean full contractual relations. Egrets Pointe, 870 F.
Supp. at 116. Tortious interference claims cannot be
predicated on conduct that was a mere "hindrance" to
contract formation. Id.
Plaintiffs cannot assert a claim for prospective
interference for the simple reason that Rosen entered into
an agreement with [*75] Clemson by executing the
October 2003 Agreement. The October 2003 Agreement
expressly terminated each of the agreements that underlie
the prospective interference claim. Plaintiffs cannot
recover on a theory that the consummated October 2003
Agreement was less profitable to them than it would have
been without BMW's interference; it is not actionable to
be a "hindrance" to an agreement. Id.

Page 21
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7410, *75

Finally, Plaintiffs must support their prospective
interference claim with a similar showing of improper
means or purpose as is required to support their tortious
interference claim. As discussed more fully above,
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that BMW acted with an
improper motive or used improper means.
D. Civil Conspiracy
Plaintiffs third cause of action alleges that BMW
conspired with "agents or representative of Clemson
and/or agents or representatives of the State of South
Carolina, for the purpose of injuring Plaintiffs." (1st Am.
Compl. PI90.) A civil conspiracy cause of action
contains the following elements: (1) a combination of two
or more persons, (2) for the purpose of injuring the
plaintiff, (3) which causes the plaintiff special damage.
Vaught v. Waites, 300 S.C 201, 387 S.E.2d 91, 95 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1989). [*76] To recover on a conspiracy claim,
Plaintiffs must show that the "object of the conspiracy
was to ruin or damage the business of another." Waldrep
Bros., 992 F.2d at 63. BMW is entitled to summary
judgment on this cause of action.
As an initial matter, any efforts by BMW to lobby
the State of South Carolina and Clemson University are
protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See City of
Columbia, 499 U.S. at 383. Recasting the claim as one
for conspiracy does not change this result, as the Supreme
Court has rejected the argument that there is a conspiracy
exception to Noerr-Pennington. Id. Setting aside the
Noerr-Pennington issue, a conspiracy claim requires
proof that the defendant was acting not in pursuit of its
own business objectives, but to "ruin or damage" the
plaintiff. Waldrep, 992 F.2d at 63. Plaintiffs have not
alleged that BMW was acting to ruin their business, much
less elicited any evidence of such a motive. As noted
above, Plaintiffs actually allege BMW was pursuing
legitimate business purposes. Moreover, the record is
clear that BMW was motivated by its desire to establish
the GEC, which again constitutes a legitimate purpose.
To properly plead a cause of action for [*77] civil
conspiracy, the plaintiff must allege certain acts carried
out pursuant to the conspiracy. See Lee v. Chesterfield
Gen. Hosp., Inc., 289 S.C 6, 344 S.E.2d 379, 382 (S.C
Ct. App. 1986). The acts alleged to constitute the
conspiracy cannot be identical to the acts alleged in
support of other causes of action. Kuznik v. Bees Ferry
Assocs., 342 S.C 579, 538 S.EJd 15, 31 (S.C. Ct. App.
2000). In addition, damages pled in a claim for civil

conspiracy must be pled with specificity. Fed. R. Civ. P.
9(g). Special damages must also be different than
damages pled for other causes of action in the same
complaint. Charleston Aluminum, LLC v. Samuel, Son &
Co., Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60845 (D.S.C August
15, 2006). Summary judgment is appropriate when the
damages claimed for conspiracy overlap with or are
subsumed by the damages sought for other causes of
action. Parkman v. Univ. of South Carolina, 44 F. App'x
606, 620 (4th Cir. 2002).
Plaintiffs' third cause of action generically restates
the allegations made in support of its earlier causes of
action. It does not contain any unique factual allegations
and is in no way factually distinguishable from the other
causes of action alleged against BMW. Similarly, [*78]
the only special damages identified by Plaintiffs in their
third cause of action are "loss of profits and loss of
development and management fees." (1st Am. Compl.
P191.) Yet Plaintiffs have included the identical language
of "loss of profits and loss of development and
management fees" in all three of their causes of action.
Because Plaintiffs have failed to allege special damages
that are distinct from the damages sought in their other
causes of action, summary judgment on this claim is
further justified.
E. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs have moved for partial summary judgment
on two elements of their cause of action for tortious
interference with contract. Plaintiffs' motion is rendered
moot by the Court's resolution of BMW's Motion for
Summary Judgment. Even as to the merits, Plaintiffs'
motion would be denied because it improperly seeks
summary judgment on select factual issues rather than an
entire cause of action. Evergreen Int'l, S.A. v. Marinex
Constr. Co., 477F. Supp. 2d697, 698-99 (D.S.C 2007).
III. CONCLUSION
After careful review of the memoranda and evidence
submitted by the parties, it is clear that Plaintiffs have not
created a genuine issue [*79] of material fact as to each
essential element of their case. Not only does the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine provide a complete defense to
all causes of action asserted against BMW, Plaintiffs
have further failed to meet their burden as to the
individual causes of action asserted in the First Amended
Complaint.
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that BMW's Motion for
Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED.

G. ROSS ANDERSON, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ G. Ross Anderson, Jr.

Anderson, South Carolina
January 31, 2008

